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Bad debt deductions and doubtful debt allowances provide relief to taxpayers who would be 
subject to income tax on amounts accrued to them which may never be received.  No definition 
of a bad or doubtful debt is provided in the Income Tax Act. This dissertation considered 
current legislation, historical court cases, academic writing and the views expressed by SARS 
through explanatory memoranda and directives in order to establish when a debt becomes 
bad or doubtful and the extent of the relief granted. This dissertation also considered the 
future of the doubtful debt allowance in light of the change of accounting standards from IAS 
39 to IFRS 9. There are no specific requirements for a debt to become bad or doubtful. Whether 
a debt is bad is a factual question taking into account all relevant facts. Whether a debt is 
doubtful and the extent of the allowance granted is determined by the Commissioner, but that 
determination must be reasonable. The Commissioner relies on IAS 39 rules of impairment as 
the starting point for determination of a doubtful debt allowance. IFRS 9 determines 
impairment in a significantly different manner to IAS 39, abandoning the requirement that a 
“loss event” must have occurred. Adoption of IFRS 9 will result in a change to the 
determination of doubtful debt allowances, for example, by reducing the generally accepted 
rate of 25% of identified doubtful debts or by requiring the taxpayer to compile a list of debts 
which would have qualified as doubtful under IAS 39. 
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1.1 Background and rationale for research 
The Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (“the Act”) defines gross income in the case of a resident 
as “the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such a 
resident.”1 A taxpayer must therefore include amounts in gross income not only when cash is 
received by the taxpayer, but also when an amount is accrued to the taxpayer. Our courts 
have determined that accrual takes place when the taxpayer becomes unconditionally 
entitled to an amount. An amount need not be due and payable for it to accrue to a taxpayer.2  
Where a taxpayer provides goods or services on credit a timing difference will occur. As the 
sale of goods and services becomes unconditional when the goods or services are provided 
to the customer, the taxpayer must include the full amount of the sale in their gross income.    
Where payment is only made by the consumer after the year of assessment, the taxpayer will 
bear the burden of taxation before receiving the cash to which they are entitled. This timing 
mismatch is worsened when debtors default on their debt and the funds are never received. 
In order to ensure that the taxpayer is not taxed on amounts which are never received, the 
Act provides a deduction where a debt has become bad and an allowance where it is 
anticipated that debt will become bad. These sections seem to propose a straightforward 
answer to the burden of being taxed on sales for which no amount was received, but the 
application is far from clear. The terms ‘bad’, ‘doubtful’ and even ‘debt’ are not defined in the 
Act. Consequently, I have observed instances of disputes between the taxpayer and SARS over 
the requirements for a debt to be doubtful. These disputes include differences in 
interpretation of what recovery actions the Act requires of a taxpayer, how unlikely recovery 
should be before a debt may be considered bad and written off, or the amount of the 
allowance which may be claimed when a debt is doubtful.  
Each of these areas of uncertainty has an effect on the taxable income of the taxpayer. A bad 
debt deduction is 100% of the value of a debt which has been identified as bad, whereas a 
                                                     
1 Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962: section 1, definition of “gross income”  
2 Lategan v CIR 1926 2 SATC 16 and CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd 1990 52 SATC 9 
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doubtful debt allowance provides relief for only a fraction of the doubtful debt.3 Any 
difference in classification between bad and doubtful debts has the potential to significantly 
reduce the relief provided to taxpayers. For most taxpayers any effect on their taxable income 
will be minor. This is because the doubtful debt allowance merely results in a timing 
difference, with the doubtful debt allowance claimed in year one added back in year two. 
However, in industries such as large retailers who allow their clients to make purchases on 
credit, the number of doubtful debtors and the aggregate value of those debts can be quite 
substantial. Differences over the classification of bad and doubtful debts, allowance rates and 
requirements for bad debt recovery would all result in a significant cash flow movements and 
possibly deprivation of interest income and profits for the taxpayer.4  
At the time of writing this dissertation a number of changes to legislation governing doubtful 
debts are underway. Section 18(1)(j) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 25 of 2015 
called for the release of a public notice by the Commissioner detailing criteria by which 
doubtful debts will be evaluated. The introduction of a set of criteria governing the evaluation 
of doubtful debts to which the taxpayer can refer into the text of the Act is an opportunity to 
clarify a number of legal uncertainties. The public notice has not yet been released. The 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 17 of 2017 introduced a new subsection, 11(jA), which 
replaces the Commissioner’s discretion with fixed percentages when evaluating the doubtful 
debts of the banking sector. In addition, an upcoming change in the accounting standard 
governing financial instruments5, from International Accounting Standard 39 (“IAS 39”) to 
International Financial Reporting Standard 9 (“IFRS 9”) will lead to a wide ranging re-
evaluation as to how section 11(j) relates to amounts disclosed as impaired debtors in a 
taxpayer’s financial statements. How these changes will affect the determination of bad and 
doubtful debts and the deductions and allowances granted by the Act is uncertain. 
                                                     
3 The allowance is at the discretion of the Commissioner, but is usually 25%.  
4 As a doubtful debt allowance must be added back in the year of assessment following the year in which it was 
claimed there is effectively no tax benefit when the effect of the two years of assessment is taken in aggregate. 
However, where the taxpayer is required to pay tax in the first year of assessment that taxpayer will be unable 
to use those funds to invest in expanding their business or investing. The interest from investing or business 
opportunities foregone due to reduced available funds is the economic cost of the interpretation of the 
allowance on the taxpayer.   
5 A term which includes debtors. 
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1.2 Research questions 
This dissertation seeks to determine the current legal position regarding bad and doubtful 
debts by performing a comprehensive review of current legislation, historical court cases, 
academic writing and the views expressed by SARS through explanatory memoranda and 
directives. This dissertation will also consider the future of the doubtful debt allowance in 
light of the change of accounting standards from IAS 39 to IFRS 9. By summarising the current 
legal position and the areas of dispute, this dissertation aims to answer the following four 
questions:   
1. When will a debt be considered bad? 
2. When will a debt be considered doubtful? 
3. How is the allowance granted in terms of section 11(j) determined and how may the 
taxpayer challenge this determination? 
4. How will the change from IAS 39 to IFRS 9 affect the process by which the 
Commissioner determines the allowance to be granted in terms of a doubtful debt? 
1.3 Limitation of scope 
This dissertation will focus only on sections 11(i) and 11(j) of the Act and the proposed section 
11(jA). There will be no consideration of the effects of a sale of a debtors book. This 
dissertation will not consider the treatment of bad debts incurred by money-lenders where 
the amounts loaned constitute the floating capital. These amounts are deducted in terms of 
the general deduction formula in section 11(a) rather than section 11(i). This dissertation will 
not consider the treatment of bad or doubtful debts for Value-added Tax or any other tax 
purposes. This dissertation will not consider the treatment of bad or doubtful debts in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
The answers to the research questions raised in 1.2 will depend on the factual circumstances 
faced by the taxpayer. As a result, the findings provided by this dissertation may not be 
capable of providing certainty in its answers. 
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This dissertation explores impending changes to the tax legislation. The proposed 
amendments may still be altered further which may have a significant impact on the content 
of portions of this dissertation. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This dissertation will follow a doctrinal research methodology. The rules governing bad and 
doubtful debts will be systematically considered in an attempt to identify how the totality of 
South African law at present would answer the research questions set out above. As such, 
this dissertation will consider:  
1. South African legislation relating to bad and doubtful debts; 
2. South African court cases concerning bad and doubtful debts;  
3. South African academic literature, legal commentaries and textbooks on bad and 
doubtful debts; 
4. SARS practice and interpretation notes, explanatory memoranda and sector and 
directives; and 
5. The text, and articles on the application of IAS 39 and IFRS 9.   
1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2: Bad Debts 
Chapter 2 considers the current approach to legislative interpretation set out in Natal Joint 
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). The chapter 
then considers the language, purpose and context of section 11(i), including a brief historical 
analysis of the substantive developments in relation to this section. The correct timing of the 
determination of a bad debt is considered. Finally, the chapter considers when a debt is bad. 
Chapter 3: Doubtful Debts 
Chapter 3 considers the principles of interpretation and the language, purpose and context 
of section 11(j) including a brief historical analysis of the substantive developments in relation 
to this section. The correct timing of the determination of a doubtful debt is then considered. 
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The chapter considers when a debt is considered to be doubtful. Attention is paid to the 
distinction between bad and doubtful debts. Finally, the proposed amendment to section 
11(j) is summarised and considered. 
Chapter 4: The Discretion of the Commissioner and the Taxpayer’s rights to dispute  
Following the introduction to the concept of the Commissioner’s discretion in Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 considers the requirement that the allowance granted by the Commissioner adhere 
to the constitutional right to just administrative action. The Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 
2011 and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 give expression to this 
right in relation to the granting of a doubtful debt allowance.  The relief granted to the 
taxpayer by these acts is considered. The principles of lawfulness, reasonableness and 
procedural fairness inherent in just administration are considered in terms of how the 
allowance in terms of section 11(j) may be granted. 
Chapter 5: The BASA Directive: An example of the Commissioner’s discretion 
Chapter 5 evaluates an example of the exercise of the Commissioner’s section 11(j). The 17 
February 2012 letter issued by SARS to the Chairman of the Banking Association of South 
Africa (“the Directive”) sets out the manner in which the Commissioner will exercise their 
discretion. The content of the Directive is summarised and evaluated against the legal 
principles established in the previous chapters. The Taxation Law Amendment Act No. 17 of 
2017 replaces the approach established in the Directive with section 11(jA). Chapter 5 
summarises the function of section 11(jA) and considers how this new approach relates to 
the legal principles established in previous chapters.  
Chapter 6: IFRS 9 and its impact on the allowance for doubtful debts 
Chapter 6 considers the impact the change in accounting standard from IAS 39 to IFRS 9 will 
have on the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in section 11(j). This chapter provides 
an explanation of the IFRS 9 approach to the impairment of Financial Instruments and the 
impact that approach will have on the disclosure of doubtful debts in the annual financial 
statements of a taxpayer. The Chapter then speculates on possible approaches to the exercise 
of section 11(j)’s discretion which may be adopted by SARS in response to the change in 
accounting standard.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Chapter 7 will summarise and conclude on the findings of the preceding chapters and 




2 Bad Debts 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the current wording of section 11(i) of the Act is analysed using the principles 
of interpretation set out in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 
(4) SA 593 (SCA). This chapter considers the meaning of the section looking at the language, 
context and purpose of the provision and the changes made to section 11(i) over the past 92 
years. The rulings made by South African courts when considering section 11(i) are 
summarised. The correct time for the determination of whether a debt has become bad is 
considered. Finally, the chapter considers when a debt is bad.  
2.2 Interpretation of the Act 
2.2.1 Principles of interpretation 
The principles applicable when interpreting a statutory provision were recently clarified in 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality6 in which Wallis JA said the 
following: 
“[18] … The present state of the law can be expressed as follows: Interpretation is the 
process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some 
other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by 
reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole 
and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature 
of the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of 
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision 
appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those 
responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible each 
possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The process is objective, 
not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or 
unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges 
must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as 
                                                     
6 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA): [18] 
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reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to 
a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and 
legislation; in a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other than 
the one they in fact made. The 'inevitable point of departure is the language of the 
provision itself', read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision 
and the background to the preparation and production of the document.”  [my 
emphasis] 
The following sections follow the approach suggested, considering section 11(i) in terms of 
the language, context and purpose of the provision. As described in the Natal Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality7, the context and language of the section must be 
considered together with neither predominating over the other.8 This principle is in line with 
the dictum of the Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) which stated that:  
“the emerging trend in statutory construction is to have regard to the context in which 
the words occur, even where the words to be construed are clear and unambiguous.”  
Therefore, although Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality9 does state 
that the “inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself”, the process of 
interpretation will not be complete until the context of the section and the purpose of the 
provision have been considered. 
2.2.2 The language of the provision 
The current version of section 11(i) follows below:  
“11. General deductions allowed in determination of taxable income. – For the 
purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on 
                                                     
7 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) 
8 SAICA, 2013 
9 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) 
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any trade, there shall be allowed as deductions from the income of such person so 
derived-    
(i) the amount of any debt due to the taxpayer which has during the year of assessment 
become bad, provided such amount is included in the current or was included in 
previous years of assessment in the taxpayer’s income;” 
The subsections that follow highlight the salient concepts in the wording of the current 
legislation.  
 ‘debt due’ 
The term ‘debt’ is defined in the Act for the purposes of section 19 and paragraph 12A of the 
Eighth Schedule as not including a tax debt as defined in section 1 of the Tax Administration 
Act No. 28 of 2011 (“TAA”). The TAA defines a “tax debt” as “an amount referred to in section 
169(1),” Section 169(1) states that “An amount of tax due or payable in terms of a tax Act is a 
tax debt due to SARS for the benefit of the National Revenue Fund.” Section 19 and paragraph 
12A concern the income tax and capital gains tax consequences of a reduction of debt. 
Reduction of debt refers to the forgiveness of debt through agreement or unilateral decision 
and is not applicable where a debt is written down but still kept in the financial statements or 
is written off by a taxpayer due to the expectation of non-recovery.10 These definitions 
therefore confirm only what a debt is not. There is no definition of what a debt is. According 
to case law, the ordinary meaning of debt is:  
‘that which is owed or due; anything (as money, goods or services) which one person 
is under obligation to pay or render to another.’11  
The term ‘debt due’ is not defined in section 11 or any other section of the Act.  In CIR v 
People’s Stores (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) 52 SATC 9 Judge Hefer considered obiter the meaning of the 
term.  
                                                     
10 Stiglingh, M., et al, 2016: 24.8 




“Counsel for the taxpayer, albeit in a different manner, also relied on the provisions of 
the Act relating to bad or doubtful debts. Section 11(i) and (j) respectively provide for 
a deduction in respect of bad and doubtful ‘debts due to the taxpayer’. If the Lategan  
principle were to be applied, so the argument went, the anomalous result would be 
that debts due to the taxpayer would be subject to the deduction for bad or doubtful 
debts, whereas debts owing to him but not due would have to be included in his ‘gross 
income’ without the benefit of such a deduction. The problem that I have with this 
submission is that it presupposes that the word ‘due’ in s 11(i) and (j) means ‘due 
and payable’, which is by no means clear. Admittedly, ‘due’ often means ‘due and 
payable’ when it is said, for example, that a debt is due or when one speaks of the due 
date of a debt. But I am not convinced that the word was used in that sense here. ‘Due 
and payable’ is actually used at least twice in the Act (in ss 7(1) and 91(3)) and in s 
7A(2) mention is even made of a salary or pension which ‘has become payable’. Taking 
account also of the Afrikaans version of s 11(i) and (j) (‘skulde aan die belatingpligtige 
verskuldig’) it appears to me rather that due was intended to mean ‘owing’ and no 
more.” [my emphasis] 
Judge Hefer noted that while “due” is often used to mean “due and payable” when speaking 
of a debt, the terms “due” and “payable” are distinct concepts. When a debt is “payable” 
there exists a right to claim payment; when a debt is “due” there exists a right to payment in 
the future.12 Section 11(i) requires only that the debt be “due.” The taxpayer is therefore not 
required to be in a position to enforce payment.  
It has been suggested13 that the addition of the word ‘due’ qualifies the ownership of the debt 
and that consequently the debt must belong to the taxpayer at the end of the year of 
assessment. It has further been suggested14 that where a debt is sold or a taxpayer 
compromises with one of his debtors, a bad debt deduction cannot be claimed. As the debt 
would no longer be due to the taxpayer, it is submitted that this approach is correct. 
                                                     
12 Lategan v CIR 1926 2 SATC 16 
13 Stiglingh, M., et al, 2016: 8.37 
14 Stiglingh, M., et al, 2016: 8.37 
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 ‘which has…become bad’  
The phrase ‘which has during the year of assessment become bad’ refers to what is commonly 
known as a ‘bad debt’. The term ‘bad debt’ does not appear in the section, nor is it used 
anywhere else in the Act. The term ‘bad’ is not defined in the Act, nor can it be described as 
a term of art with a specific legal connotation. In the absence of a defined meaning, a term 
should generally be given the meaning it bears in the particular trade, business or vocation 
where that term is used.  
1. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a ‘bad debt’ as “an uncollectable debt.”15 
2. The term ‘bad debt’ is a commonly used accounting term and is defined in the 
Dictionary of Accounting Terms as ‘a debt that, is assumed, will never be paid” and 
“[a] debt that has not been paid and has been written off.”16 [my emphasis] 
3. The Macmillan Dictionary of Accounting defines a ‘bad debt’ as “an amount owing 
which is not expected to be received and is therefore written off either to a bad debts 
account or to a previously established provision for bad (or doubtful debts).”17 [my 
emphasis] 
4. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary18 and the Cambridge Dictionary19 define a 
‘bad debt’ as ‘a debt that is not likely to be paid’. [my emphasis] 
As can be seen from many of the definitions quoted above, the ordinary definition of a bad 
debt contains within it a degree of uncertainty. Determining whether a debt is bad will often 
involve an element of estimation. What is unclear from both the ordinary definitions and the 
wording of section 11(i) is to what degree the judgement of the taxpayer in situations of 
uncertainty is permitted. 
                                                     
15 Black’s Law Dictionary: “bad debt”  
16 Dictionary of Accounting Terms: “bad debt” 
17 Macmillan Dictionary of Accounting: “bad debt” 
18 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary: “bad debt” 
19 Cambridge Dictionary: “bad debt” 
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2.2.3 The purpose of the provision 
Section 11 of the Act provides the taxpayer with a number of possible deductions against 
income from carrying on a trade. Generally, an amount falls within a taxpayer’s gross income 
and therefore, its taxable income, if it is received or accrued, that is to say, if the taxpayer 
acquires an unconditional entitlement to the amount. To subject a taxpayer to income tax on 
an amount which although accrued will likely not be received would result in an inequity. 
Section 11(i) is directed at alleviating this inequity.20 
2.2.4 The context of the provision 
Bad and doubtful debts were originally dealt with under the same subsection in Income Tax 
Act No. 40 of 1925.21 When that Act was replaced with the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, the 
treatment of bad and doubtful debts was placed into two separate sections. The amendments 
to section 11(i) over the last 92 years are presented in the table below. 
Table 1: Amendments to the wording of section 11(i) between 1925 and 2017    
Section 11(2)(g) of 
the Income Tax Act 
No. 40 of 1925 
The amount of any debts due to the taxpayer which are proved to 
the satisfaction of the Commissioner to be bad or doubtful, any 
deduction in respect of doubtful debts being made according to a 
value determined by the Commissioner.” 
Income Tax Act No. 
58 of 1962 
“the amount of any debts due to the taxpayer to the extent to which 
they are proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary to be bad, 
provided such amount is included in the current year of assessment 
or was included in previous years of assessment” 
Income Tax 
Amendment Act No. 
89 of 1969  
“the amount of any debts due to the taxpayer to the extent to which 
they are proved to the satisfaction of the Secretary to be bad, 
provided such amount is included in the current year of assessment 
or was included in previous years of assessment (including in the case 
                                                     
20 CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242: 257 
21 Section 11(2)(g) of Income Tax Act No. 40 of 1925 
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of a company, years of assessment under any Income Tax Ordinance 
of the territory) in the taxpayer’s income.” 
Income Tax 
Amendment Act No. 
94 of 1983 
 
“the amount of any debts due to the taxpayer to the extent to 
which they are proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to 
be bad, provided such amount is included in the current year of 
assessment or was included in previous years of assessment in the 
taxpayer’s income.” 
Income Tax 
Amendment Act No. 
113 of 1993 
“the amount of any debts due to the taxpayer which have during 
the year of assessment become bad, provided such amount is 
included in the current year of assessment or was included in 
previous years of assessment in the taxpayer’s income.”  
Taxation Laws 
Amendment Act No. 
22 of 2012 
“the amount of any debt due to the taxpayer which has during the 
year of assessment become bad, provided such amount is included 
in the current year of assessment or was included in previous years 
of assessment in the taxpayer’s income.” 
 
The progression of section 11(i) shows only two major changes: the removal of the 
Commissioner’s discretion in determining the extent of bad debts claimed and the relatively 
smaller change of the plural ‘debts’, to the singular ‘debt’. The 2012 change of ‘debts’ to ‘debt’ 
was stated in Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2012 to be 
merely a terminology change taking place across the entire act. It would thus be inappropriate 
to draw any conclusion from the change of plural to singular as it was not the intention of the 
legislature to make a substantive change to the functioning of the section. 
The removal of the Commissioner’s discretion in 1993 is a more substantial change. Prior to 
the 1993 amendment the taxpayer was required to prove to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner that a debt was bad. The Commissioner was in effect granted a discretion to 
determine whether evidence provided by the taxpayer was sufficient. The difficulty in 
14 
 
challenging an exercise of discretion can be clearly seen in Income Tax Case 93 1927 3 SATC 
239(U): 
“The Commissioner had a discretion and that discretion had been delegated, as was 
authorised under the Act, to this official. The Court had to be satisfied by unequivocal 
evidence that that official had not applied his mind to the subject in terms of the 
Act…He had given his evidence, and that evidence satisfied the Court quite clearly that 
he had applied his mind to the problem and exercised his discretion fairly, the Court 
could not say to the Commissioner “You have exercised your discretion wrongly and 
the figure you have allowed is wrong.” The discretion had been properly exercised 
and the court could not interfere.” [my emphasis] 
The strict approach to the application of the Commissioner’s discretion demonstrated in the 
above quote was softened later.22 The 1993 amendment means the Commissioner is 
expected to make an objective evaluation of whether the debt has become bad, based on the 
facts. However, as our courts have not provided us with any firm rulings on the characteristics 
of a bad debt, we are still left with uncertainty. Practically, this amendment may make it easier 
to dispute a ruling of the Commissioner; where previously the taxpayer was required to prove 
that the Commissioner had exercised their discretion inappropriately, the taxpayer need now 
only prove that the debt was bad, a less onerous burden to discharge.  
2.3 When should the determination of whether a debt has become bad occur?  
The wording of section 11(i) is aligned with the concept of tax as an annual event, referring 
to debts which have “during the year of assessment become bad.”23 Therefore, if at the end 
of a particular year of assessment it is determined that an amount which accrued during the 
current or a previous year of assessment is bad, the taxpayer will be allowed to deduct the 
amount. This concept was expressed in Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR 1975 (1) SA 665 (A) as follows: 
                                                     
22 The ability of modern courts to evaluate the substance of an exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion is 
discussed in 4.4 below. 
23 Section 11(i) of Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 
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“It is clear from these provisions that income tax is assessed on an annual basis in 
respect of the taxable income received by or accrued to any person during the period 
of assessment, and determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In 
determining the taxable income of a person carrying on any trade in any year of 
assessment there is, in terms of sec. 11 (a), deductible from such person's income the 
expenditure actually incurred by him in the production of the income during that year 
of assessment. (Sub-Nigel Ltd., v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 1948 (4) S. A. 580 
(A. D.) at p. 589). It is only at the end of the year of assessment that it is possible, and 
then it is imperative, to determine the amounts received or accrued on the one hand 
and the expenditure actually incurred on the other during the year of assessment. 
(Cf. Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 1936 
C. P. D. 241 at p. 244, and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Delfos, 1933 A. D. 242 
at p. 257).” [my emphasis] 
Income Tax Case 592 1945 14 SATC 243 held that bad debts are to be claimed in the year in 
which the taxpayer finally regards the debts as bad.24 In CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242 it was held 
that whether a debt is bad or not must be decided at the time when the debt is claimed as a 
deduction and according to the then existing financial circumstances of the debtor.25 It is 
SARS’ practice to allow a taxpayer to determine bad debts when the taxpayer’s financial 
statements are drawn up.26 It is submitted that the appropriate timing for the determination 
of whether a debt is bad should take place at the time of the preparation of the income tax 
return as stated CIR v Delfos.27 However, it is also submitted that a distinction should be drawn 
between determinations based on information providing insight into conditions as at the end 
of the year of assessment and information illuminating conditions which arose after year end. 
Only the former should be used in the determination of bad debts. Information about 
conditions arising after the end of the year of assessment will not be applicable as that 
information would relate to debts which become bad in the succeeding year of assessment. 
                                                     
24 Income Tax Case 592 1945 14 SATC 243: 246 
25 CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242: 257 
26 Stiglingh, M., et al, 2016: 8.5 
27 See CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242 at 243 
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This approach is in line with the accounting treatment of events taking place after the end of 
the financial period.28 By requiring a taxpayer to claim bad debts in the year in which they 
occur, the reality of the taxpayer’s financial situation at year end is correctly reflected in its 
return. SARS is also protected from the taxpayer delaying the recognition of a bad debt until 
a time at which it is beneficial for the taxpayer.29  
In Anderton and Halstead, Limited v Birrell (Inspector of Taxes) [1932] 1 K.B. 271, which dealt 
with a section of the English Act on bad debts and was cited with approval in CIR v Delfos, it 
was held that: 
‘…what the statute requires therefore is an estimate to what extent a debt is bad, and 
this is for the purpose of a profit and loss account. Such an estimate is not a prophecy 
to be judged by after events, but a valuation of an asset de praesenti upon an 
uncertain future to be judged with regard to its soundness as an estimate upon the 
then facts and probabilities.’30 [my emphasis] 
From the above quote we see that should the financial position of a debtor improve such that 
a debt which was previously claimed as a bad debt can now be said to be likely to be repaid, 
the original classification of the debt as bad is not incorrect and will not be required to be 
reversed.31 When a bad debt is recovered in a subsequent year of assessment it is included in 
the gross income of the taxpayer for the year of assessment during which it has been 
received.32 As noted previously, this recoupment provision acknowledges that the original 
estimate of bad debts made by the taxpayer may subsequently be proved to be incorrect. It 
therefore follows that the point at which a bad debt is determined is therefore not at the 
                                                     
28 International Accounting Standard 10 - Events after the reporting period 
29 Zulman, RH., Preiss, M., Silke, J.: [A:B8] Bad Debts – Hoarding of 
30 CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242: 258 to 259 
31 CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242: 258 
32 Section 8(4)(a) of Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 
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point when non-recovery is certain, but rather at the date of submission of the return for the 
year of assessment in which the taxpayer concluded that the debt was bad.33 
2.4 Determining whether a debt is bad  
The courts have refrained from providing a definitive list of factors which must be considered 
before a bad debt deduction is allowed. While SARS has in correspondence with taxpayers at 
times asserted that all appropriate steps to collect the debt (either through in-house or 
external agency efforts) must have been taken before a debt is regarded as bad, no such 
requirement is present in case law. In Income Tax Case 9334 it was held that it is a question of 
fact as to whether or not a debt is bad. No general principles can be given and each case must 
be viewed in the light of its own particular set of facts. It is submitted that it is also not a 
requirement that the bad debt should have been recorded in the financial statements of the 
taxpayer. As discussed in 2.3, the appropriate time for the determination of a bad debt is the 
time at which the return is submitted.  Income Tax Case No. 1284 (1978) 41 SATC 45 (R) 
considers how this issue of timing provides insight to whether an entry in the financial 
statements of a taxpayer is necessary for a bad debt to be claimed. In that case Judge Pringle 
said: 35   
“There is apparent support for the respondent’s contention, that failure to enter as a 
bad debt in appellant’s books the sum of $72 000 on or before 31 March 1976 preclude 
deduction, in Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR (1975) 37 SATC 1 (AD) at 11, in fin, where Botha 
JA said that it is only at the end of the year of assessment that it is possible, and then 
it is imperative, to determine the amounts received or accrued on the one hand and 
the expenditure actually incurred on the other during the year of assessment. 
However, the main authority to which his Lordship referred was CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 
242 at 257. It will be observed that in that case Curlewis JA referred to the drawing up 
                                                     
33 As the debt must have been included in the taxpayer’s income before it may be claimed as bad, were a debt 
to become bad before it had been included in the taxpayer’s income the wording of the Act would prevent the 
debt from ever being claimed as bad. Such a situation could occur where the foreign debt becomes bad while 
subject to section 9A of the Act (Blocked foreign funds). 
34 (1927) 3 SATC 239 
35 (1978) 41 SATC 45 (R): 49 
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of the profit and loss account and balance sheet for a year of assessment as the stage 
when a debt is written off. It seems unlikely that had he disagreed with that view Mr 
Justice Botha would not have said so. Further in the Caltex Oil case at 13 Mr Justice 
Botha indicated that an entry in books of account in relation to a bad debt which had 
become incorrect by reason of fluctuations in the rates of exchange did not govern; on 
the contrary the true figure at the end of the year not entered in the books was the 
operative figure. In my view it is not a requirement of s 15(2)(a) of our Act that a bad 
debt should have been entered in a taxpayer’s book of account during the 
accounting period or year of assessment in respect of which deduction is claimed.” 
[my emphasis] 
It is submitted that Judge Pringle was correct when he stated that entering an impairment in 
the books of account of the taxpayer during the year of assessment is not a requirement for 
a bad debt deduction. Rather, whether a debt is bad or not is a factual question which will be 
answered based on the specific set of circumstances of the taxpayer. It should be noted 
therefore that while impairing a debt in either the accounting books or the debtor system of 
the taxpayer is not a requirement for a debt to be considered bad, the failure to do so would 
be a strong indicator that the taxpayer does in fact view the debt as recoverable. In Income 
Tax Case No. 128436, for example, while the court was not satisfied that entries were made in 
the taxpayer’s book before year end, the court was satisfied that  
“at least a provisional decision that a loss had been sustained which would be 
reflected in the appellant’s accounts had been made by the appellant’s managing 
director and manifested in discussions with one or more other officials of the 
[taxpayer].”37 [my emphasis] 
While it is submitted that this approach is correct, it must be acknowledged that in the 
absence of clear indicators there exists uncertainty as to when a debt is more than merely 
doubtful and may be claimed as a bad debt. 
                                                     
36 (1978) 41 SATC 45 (R) 
37 (1978) 41 SATC 45 (R): 49 
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Historical bad debt recoveries or subsequent recoveries of other taxpayers are not key 
requirements in determining the status of a debt.  It is the specific circumstances of the 
taxpayer’s specific debtors which must be evaluated by the taxpayer when determining 
whether those debts are bad. Judge Maritz in Income Tax Case 93 (1927) 3 SATC 239 (U) stated 
that: 
“The Court was only dealing with the affairs of one particular taxpayer, and sec 
11(2)(g) must be read in the light of the affairs of that taxpayer, and the decision of 
the Court must be influenced by no outside considerations. The section seemed to be 
perfectly clear. First of all the taxpayer, before he could be allowed to deduct any debts 
at all, must prove that they were bad. In other words, if the Commissioner was satisfied 
that they were bad an automatic deduction took place. Further, there were some debts 
which could not be exactly classed as bad, but might be classed as doubtful. There the 
onus was upon the taxpayer to satisfy the Commissioner that if not the whole at least 
a certain proportion of these debts was doubtful.” [my emphasis added] 
In the extract above it is clear that Judge Maritz is of the opinion that the prohibition on 
“outside considerations” is equally applicable to the determination of bad and doubtful debts. 
This judgment provides support for the denial of statistical models when determining 
whether a debt is bad. However, the manner in which both bad and doubtful debts were 
determined in 1927 when Income Tax Case 9338 was decided is significantly different from 
modern statistical methods. Early provisioning methods did not have access to computerised 
account histories which enabled them to identify long-term trends. In determining whether a 
debt was bad, focus was placed on whether certain actions, such as the exhaustion of internal 
recovery methods, had been performed to the debt and not on the probability of recovering 
the debt. This could result in situations where accounts are unable to move to the next 
category of delinquency due to the inability of the taxpayer to fulfil the criteria. Provision is 
usually made only for debts in late stage delinquency, ignoring the possibility for new 
accounts to rapidly progress to a state of irrecoverability.39 
                                                     
38 (1927) 3 SATC 239 (U) 
39 Scallan, G. 1990 
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 In 196240  and later in 197841 a statistical technique known as Markov Chains was suggested 
for us in commercial lending and the determination of doubtful debts. Markov Chains are 
probabilistic models used to determine the likelihood of movement from one state to 
another, for example, from the movement of a debtor from one level of delinquency to 
another. It is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss to the functioning of such a 
model. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the modern approach to bad and 
doubtful debt prediction is substantially more advanced than the older provisioning methods.   
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the concept of a bad debt was considered. It was noted that while bad and 
doubtful debts were originally dealt with in the same section, modern legislation separated 
the concepts into two sections. It is submitted that this separation was an indication that bad 
and doubtful debts should not be treated in a similar manner. A difference in the treatment 
of bad and doubtful debts was confirmed when amendments to the Act removed the 
discretion of the Commissioner in the determination of whether a debt is bad. 
The correct time to evaluate whether or not a debt is bad was determined to be at the point 
of submission of the period’s tax return. When considering what factors should be taken into 
account when weighing up whether or not a debt is bad, it was found that all relevant factors 
should be considered and that no specific events are requirements for a debt to be considered 
bad. It is submitted that it is unlikely that our courts will interpret section 11(i) as requiring 
that it is absolutely certain that the debt will not be paid or recoverable. Indeed, it would 
seldom be possible to do so.  It is submitted that the correct approach to the objective test 
mentioned above would be to determine whether, in the light of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, there is no reasonable likelihood that the debt will be paid or will be recovered 
by taking reasonable steps for recovery. An inaccurate deduction in terms of section 11(i) 
would not necessarily have a permanent effect. If the debt was subsequently to be paid, the 
                                                     
40 Cyert, RM., Davidson, HJ., Thompson, GL., 1962 
41 Corcoran, A.W. 1978 
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amount would be included in the taxpayer’s income as a recovery or recoupment in terms of 
section 8(4)(a). 
It was also found that the factors should be applicable to the specific debts in question and 
not to trends drawn from other taxpayers or debtors. The efficacy of such a limitation 




3 Doubtful Debts 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, as in Chapter 2, current wording of section 11(j) of the Act is discussed using the 
principles of interpretation clarified in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality.42 The meaning of the section is considered by inspection of the language, 
purpose and context of the section and the changes made to section 11(j) over the past 92 
years. The rulings made by the South African courts when considering section 11(j) are 
summarised. Finally, the chapter considers when a debt is doubtful. 
3.2 Interpretation of the Act 
3.2.1 Principles of interpretation 
As noted in Chapter 2, the principles applicable when interpreting a statutory provision were 
clarified in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality43 in which Judge 
Wallis said:  
“The 'inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself', read in 
context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background to the 
preparation and production of the document.”  
In line with this decision and the approach taken in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will consider the 
language, context and purpose of section 11(j) in order to interpret the meaning of the 
section. 44  
3.2.2 The language of the provision 
The current wording of the section follows: 
“11. General deductions allowed in determination of taxable income. – For the 
purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on 
                                                     
42 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA): 18 
43 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA): 18 
44 SAICA, 2013 
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any trade, there shall be allowed as deductions from the income of such person so 
derived-    
(j) an allowance as may be made each year by the Commissioner in respect of so much 
of any debt due to the taxpayer as the Commissioner considers to be doubtful, if that 
debt would have been allowed as a deduction under any other provisions of this Part 
had that debt become bad: Provided that such allowance shall be included in the 
income of the taxpayer in the following year of assessment;” 
 ‘debt due’ 
The term ‘debt due’ is used in section 11(j) as it is in section 11(i). It is presumed that a statute 
will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent.45 Where the same word has been 
employed it will be understood to carry the same meaning.  For a discussion of the terms 
‘debt’ and ‘debt due’ refer to 2.2.2.1.  
  ‘as the Commissioner considers doubtful’ 
The word ‘doubtful’ and the term ‘doubtful debt’ are not defined in the Act. As was the case 
with ‘bad debt’, the term ‘doubtful debt’ does not appear in the section, nor is it used 
anywhere else in the Act. The word ‘doubtful’ is not defined in the Act, nor can it be described 
as a term of art with specific legal connotation. In the absence of a defined meaning a term 
should generally be given the meaning it bears in the particular trade, business or vocation 
where the term is used. 
1. The ordinary definition of ‘doubtful’ refers to an event “of uncertain outcome or result.”46  
2. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘doubtful’ as “not known with certainty.”47 
                                                     
45 The common law principle of interpretation ex visceribus actus (“from the bowels of the Act”), means that 
legislation should be read as a consistent whole. 
46 Dictionary.com: “doubtful” 
47 Oxford Dictionary of English: “doubtful” 
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3. The Cambridge Dictionary states that “if a situation is doubtful, it is unlikely to happen or 
to be successful.”48 
 A doubtful debt is therefore, much like a bad debt, a debt the recovery of which is uncertain. 
Income Tax Case 93 quoted below states that there is a greater degree of uncertainty around 
doubtful debts.   
“In other words, if the Commissioner was satisfied that they were bad an automatic 
deduction took place. Further, there were some debts which could not be exactly 
classed as bad, but might be classed as doubtful.” [my emphasis] 
A doubtful debt is therefore a debt of which there is more uncertainty of recovery than a bad 
debt. How that difference in uncertainty is determined and at what point a debt becomes 
uncertain enough to be a bad debt is not apparent from legislation or case law.  
 ‘allowance… made each year by the Commissioner’ 
In contrast to section 11(i), the wording of section 11(j) has maintained the requirement that 
the allowance granted be to the extent that the Commissioner considers the debt to be 
doubtful. While the language used by the courts appears to indicate that they would be 
reluctant to contradict the assertions by the Commissioner as to what is and is not a doubtful 
debt,49 the Commissioner’s discretion is explicitly subject to objection and appeal to the tax 
court in terms of section 3(4) of the Act.50  
On close inspection, section 11(j) contains two separate areas of discretion for the 
Commissioner. The Commissioner is first required to consider whether a debt due is in fact 
doubtful (discussed above). Where the Commissioner is of the opinion that the debt is 
                                                     
48 Cambridge Dictionary: “doubtful” 
49 Judge Maritz in Income Tax Case 93 (1927) 3 SATC 239(U) had the following to say in this regard: ‘if he had 
applied his mind to the problem and exercised his discretion fairly, the Court could not say to the Commissioner 
“You have exercised your discretion wrongly and the figure you have allowed is wrong.”’ Judge Nathan conveyed 
a similar sentiment in Income Tax Case 273 (1933) 7 SATC 232(U): “The first objection raised to the argument 
adduced on behalf of the appellant is that the onus lies on the appellant to satisfy the Commissioner that the 
debts are bad or doubtful, and in ordinary cases that would seem to be a conclusive objection.”  
50 “3(4) Any decision of the Commissioner under the following provisions of this Act is subject to objection and 
appeal in accordance with Chapter 9 of the Tax Administration Act, namely – (b) …section 11(j)…” 
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doubtful they are then required to grant an allowance. The extent of the allowance granted 
and the manner in which that allowance must be calculated is not provided in the section. 
The courts have ruled51 that the Commissioner must apply their mind to the allowance 
granted, however in practice the Commissioner will often simply grant an allowance of 25% 
of specifically identified doubtful debts52 to the taxpayer. The Commissioner’s discretion is 
discussed in 3.3.1. 
3.2.3 The purpose of the provision 
Section 11(j) and its predecessor section 11(2)(g), like section 11(i), seek to prevent the 
inequity which arises where a taxpayer is subject to income tax on an amount unlikely to be 
received. Although the purpose of the provision is the same as section 11(i), the relief 
provided for doubtful debts differs from that provided for bad debts. While the full amount 
of a bad debt was allowed as a deduction, only a portion of a doubtful debt (a “value 
determined by the Commissioner” and later “an allowance as may be made each year by the 
Commissioner”) would be granted as an allowance. The difference in approach was due to the 
lower degree of uncertainty of recovery. As the inequity was less likely to arise it was deemed 
unnecessary for the taxpayer to be protected for the entire amount. Instead taxpayer and 
Commissioner were both partially insulated, the taxpayer from tax on an amount which may 
not be received and the Commissioner from an amount which was already accrued to the 
taxpayer and which may in fact still be received.  
3.2.4 The context of the provision 
As stated in 2.2.3, the provision of a tax allowance for doubtful debts was initially included 
together with the allowance for bad debts in Income Tax No. 40 of 1925. Since its inclusion as 
a standalone section in the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, the section 11(j) allowance for 
doubtful debts has maintained its essential characteristics. There remains an allowance which 
may be granted by the Commissioner on debts which the Commissioner is satisfied are 
                                                     
51 Income Tax Case 93 (1927) 3 SATC 239(U) 
52 Zulman, RH., Preiss, M., Silke, J.: [A:B7] Bad and doubtful debts – Doubtful debts 
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doubtful. The amendments to section 11(j) over the past 92 years are presented in the table 
below. 
Table 2: Amendments to the wording of section 11(j) between 1925 and 2017    
Section 11(2)(g) of 
the Income Tax Act 
No. 40 of 1925 
The amount of any debts due to the taxpayer which are proved 
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to be bad or doubtful, any 
deduction in respect of doubtful debts being made according to 
a value determined by the Commissioner.” 
Income Tax Act No. 
58 of 1962 
Such an allowance as may be made each year by the Secretary 
in respect of such debts due to the taxpayer as he considers to be 
doubtful: Provided that such allowance shall be included in the 
income of the taxpayer in the following year of assessment, and 
for that purpose any allowance granted in terms of paragraph (h) 
of sub-section (2) of section eleven of the Income Tax Act, 1941, 
in respect of the year of assessment ended on the thirtieth day of 
June, 1961,shall be deemed to be an allowance which was made 
in terms of this paragraph 
Income Tax 
Amendment Act 
No. 89 of 1969 
Such an allowance as may be made each year by the Secretary 
in respect of such debts due to the taxpayer as he considers to be 
doubtful: Provided that such allowance shall be included in the 
income of the taxpayer in the following year of assessment, and 
for that purpose – 
(i) Any allowance granted in terms of section 11(2)(h) of the Income 
Tax Act, 1941, in respect of the year of assessment ended on the 
thirtieth day of June, 1961; and 
(ii) Any allowance granted to any company in terms of section 
11(2)(k) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance No. 10 of 
1961), of the territory, in respect of the year of assessment, ended 




shall be deemed to be an allowance which was made in terms of 
this paragraph  
Income Tax 
Amendment Act 
No. 94 of 1983 
 
Such an allowance as may be made each year by the Secretary in 
respect of such debts due to the taxpayer as he considers to be 
doubtful: Provided that such allowance shall be included in the 
income of the taxpayer in the following year of assessment. 
Income Tax 
Amendment Act 
No. 31 of 2005  
 
An allowance as may be made each year by the Commissioner in 
respect of so much of any debts due to the taxpayer as the 
Commissioner considers to be doubtful, if those debts would 
have been allowed as a deduction under any other provisions of 
this Part had they become bad. Provided that such allowance 
shall be included in the income of the taxpayer in the following 




No. 22 of 2012   
An allowance as may be made each year by the Commissioner in 
respect of so much any debt due to the taxpayer as the 
Commissioner considers to be doubtful, if that debt would have 
been allowed as a deduction under any other provisions of this 
Part had that debt become bad; Provided that such allowance 
shall be included in the income of the taxpayer in the following 
year of assessment; 
 
There have been some additions and refinements, but unlike the amendments to the sections 
dealing with bad debts, none have substantially altered the manner of the operation of the 
section. The doubtful debt allowance has from 1969 been required to be included in the 
taxpayer’s income in the following year, changing the section from a once off determination 
of the status of a debt, to a yearly review of the creditworthiness of the taxpayer’s debtor 
base. This approach drastically reduced the potential harm to SARS as the tax effect of 
assessments of doubtful debts later determined to be recoverable would be reversed in the 
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following period. From 2015 a debt on which an allowance is claimed must have been able to 
be allowed as a deduction under any other provision of the Act should that debt become bad. 
This amendment means that, as in section 11(i), only debts which have previously been 
included as taxable income for the taxpayer will qualify as doubtful debts. The change of 
‘debts’ to ‘debt’ was stated in the Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill, 2012 to be merely a terminology change taking place across the entire Act. 
It would thus be inappropriate to draw any conclusion from the change of plural to singular 
as it was not the intention of the legislature to make a substantive change to the functioning 
of the section. 
3.3 When should the determination of whether a debt is doubtful occur?  
The primary authority for when a doubtful debt allowance must be determined is CIR v 
Delfos.53 While this case concerned a bad debt at the time the case was decided allowances 
for bad and doubtful debts were contained within the same section. No distinction was made 
between the two concepts.  The appropriate timing for the determination of bad debts was 
discussed in 2.3. It is submitted that the same considerations are applicable to the 
determination of doubtful debts. Unlike bad debts however, Section 11(j) has no requirement 
that the debt must have become doubtful during the year of assessment. As such, it is 
submitted that the taxpayer is entitled to use all information available at submission of the 
tax return to ascertain whether a debt is doubtful. 
3.4 Determining whether a debt is doubtful 
3.4.1 Distinguishing doubtful debts from bad debts 
Much of our case law dealing with bad and doubtful debts comes from the 1920’s and 
1930’s54. These cases were decided under Income Tax Act No. 40 of 1925 (“the previous Act”). 
Section 11(2)(g) of this act contained the provisions dealing with deductions for bad and for 
doubtful debts. CIR v Delfos55 illustrates the lack of a clear distinction between the concepts 
                                                     
53 1933 AD 242 
54 For example, Income Tax Case 93 (1927) 3 SATC 239(U), Income Tax Case 139 (1929) 4 SATC 212(U), Income 
Tax Case 183 (1930) 5 SATC 262(U) and Income Tax Case 273 (1933) 7 SATC 232(U).    
55 1933 AD 242 
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of a bad and a doubtful debt in case law decided under section 11(2)(g). In this Appellate 
Division case the court had to consider whether a debt owing to the taxpayer “accrues to or 
in favour of” the taxpayer during a year in which it has been proved to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner to be a bad debt or whether it would only accrue when the debt was received 
by the taxpayer. The finding of the court on this matter (that the amounts did accrue to the 
taxpayer in the year in which his salary was credited to him) is not in doubt. However, the 
court’s obiter comments and assumptions surrounding the treatment of bad and doubtful 
debts can provide insight into the court’s understanding of these terms. 
The taxpayer, a director of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Limited, 
was not paid his full salary for the period 1923 to 1929. The outstanding balance was paid to 
the taxpayer in 1930.  The Commissioner received a letter from the Secretary of the South 
African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Limited the last paragraph of which read as 
follows:  
“Owing to the financial position of the company it is possible that Mr Delfos may never 
receive the moneys due to him as managing director, but in the event of his being paid 
the whole or any part of the company undertakes to notify the Income Tax 
Commissioner, Pretoria, of the amount thereof.56” 
For the period 1923 to 1929 the Commissioner assessed the taxpayer on only the amounts 
which were paid over to him. It was the opinion of the special court and the Appellate Division 
that the only way in which the Commissioner could have assessed the taxpayer on the lesser, 
received amounts was if the outstanding amounts were considered bad debts. According to 
the assenting opinion of Judge Curlewis:  
“They were treated as bad debts and not as doubtful debts because no valuation was 
made of them as doubtful debts, the whole amounts having been deducted from the 
                                                     
56 1933 AD 242 
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‘income’ of the respondent as deductions under sec. 11(2)(g) so as to ascertain his 
‘taxable income’ within the meaning of sec. 7(1).57” [my emphasis] 
The court quoted with favour the following dictum from Anderton and Halstead, Limited v 
Birrell58:  
“What the statute requires therefore is an estimate to what extent a debt is bad, and 
this is for the purpose of a profit and loss account. Such an estimate is not a prophecy 
to be judged by after events, but a valuation of an asset de praesenti upon an uncertain 
future to be judged with regard to its soundness as an estimate upon the then fact and 
probabilities.”59 [my emphasis] 
When we consider the ruling of the Appellate Division, the above dicta and the content of the 
letter sent to the Commissioner we can make the following observations: 
1) The Appellate Division was of the opinion that where the entire value of a debt was 
claimed in full as a deduction, it must be a bad debt. This is in contrast to a doubtful 
debt allowance which would only relate to a portion of the total debt. 
2) It is possible for a debt to be considered a bad debt while there is still a possibility of 
the debt being paid. Complete certainty of non-recovery (e.g. after liquidation of the 
company) is not required. 
The first point is logical. A doubtful debt provides relief in relation to the probability of 
recovery. A 0% probability of recovery is not a requirement for a bad debt, but would certainly 
qualify as a bad debt were it to be established.  
It is the second point where the difficulty in differentiating the concepts of bad and doubtful 
debts appears. In my opinion it is both logical and appropriate that complete objective 
certainty of irrecoverability would be too high a standard of proof to provide the taxpayer 
with suitable relief.  While it is appropriate for bad debts to require a higher likelihood of non-
                                                     
57 1933 AD 242 
58 [1932] 1 K.B.: 282 
59 [1932] 1 K.B.: 282 
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recoverability than doubtful debts, there exists no clear dividing line between the two 
concepts. It is submitted that the facts of this case did not reflect a situation where a 
deduction for bad debts was appropriate. While the company was in financial difficulty, it had 
credited the debt due to the taxpayer in their books, the debt remained a liability for the 
company at the time of the ‘write off’ and the wording of the letter to the Commissioner 
admitted only that “Mr. Delfos may never receive the moneys due to him.” It is submitted that 
while the dictum from Anderton and Halstead, Limited v Birrell60 (quoted above) is a sensible 
rule, its application in the instant case was inappropriate. Perhaps the Commissioner sought 
to save face for an employee of the Commissioner who had incorrectly applied the principle 
of accrual. This absence of a clear distinction in early case law between bad and doubtful 
debts is unfortunate as the concepts are treated very differently, the full amount of a bad 
debt allowed as a deduction, but only a portion of a doubtful debt granted as an allowance at 
the discretion of the Commissioner.  
3.4.2 The discretion of the Commissioner to grant a doubtful debt allowance 
The manner in which the Commissioner is to apply their discretion was considered by the 
courts in Income Tax Case 273 (1933) 7 SATC 232. The taxpayer claimed a certain amount as 
a doubtful debt deduction. In prior years of assessment, the taxpayer had claimed (and the 
Commissioner allowed), a doubtful debt allowance of greater than 25% of the doubtful debts 
identified. In the instant year of assessment, the Commissioner allowed only 25% of the total 
statement of doubtful debts due to the appellant. No evidence was provided to the court with 
regard to the history of the company’s bad debts. Instead the Commissioner relied on the 
assertion that it was the onus of the taxpayer to satisfy the Commissioner that debts have 
become bad or doubtful and as authority for the figure of 25% the Commissioner referred to 
Barnes’ Income Tax Handbook, p.78 which stated that: 
“An allowance in respect of doubtful debts may be made ‘according to a value 
determined by the Commissioner.’ (Sec 11(2)(g)). A list of debts regarded as doubtful 
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must be supplied. The allowance will never exceed 25 per cent of the list doubtful debts 
– arbitrary amounts not being allowed.” 
While the court agreed it was correct that the taxpayer bore the onus of satisfying the 
Commissioner of the extent to which an allowance should be granted,61 the court found that 
the Commissioner, in simply granting an allowance of 25% of the debtors identified 
irrespective of the merits of the debts in question, had not applied his mind. The appeal was 
allowed, the assessment set aside and the matter referred back to the Commissioner for 
further investigation and re-assessment. 
Income Tax Case 27362 thus established in law that the Commissioner must ‘apply his mind’ 
to the determination of a doubtful debt allowance and cannot simply rely on an arbitrary 
figure when making that determination. However, it remains SARS’ practice to grant a 
doubtful debt allowance in the amount of 25% of identified doubtful debtors.63 This simplistic 
approach is most likely due to the lack of capacity available to the functionaries of SARS to 
properly investigate and ‘apply their minds’ to the nature and circumstances of each 
individual doubtful allowance claimed by a taxpayer. It is certainly true that this would be an 
onerous task. Dr Manfred Nathan, K.C in Income Tax Case 27364 however, had little sympathy 
for this state of affairs. In concluding the judgement of Income Tax Case 27365 he stated that: 
“The Act does not talk about an arbitrary standard or percentage, but says that there 
must be a value, and under these circumstances, if it is thought that this is 
inconvenient, then the Legislature must be applied to alter the Act. While the Act 
stands we can only carry into effect what was intended by the Legislature.” [my 
emphasis] 
In the 84 years since this judgment was handed down the Legislature has indeed been applied 
to alter the Act. However, the manner in which the current section 11(j) describes the 
                                                     
61 Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011 section 102. Burden of Proof 
62 (1933) 7 SATC 232 
63 de Koker, AP., Williams, RC. 2017: 8.38 
64 (1933) 7 SATC 232 (U) 
65 (1933) 7 SATC 232 (U) 
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discretionary powers of the Commissioner is very similar to the equivalent section at the time 
the judgment in Income Tax Case 27366 was delivered. It is submitted that the wording of the 
Act has not been substantially changed and that there remains a responsibility on the 
Commissioner to apply his mind to the circumstances of each taxpayer and each debtor. It is 
further submitted that the SARS practice of allowing a flat rate of 25% of identified doubtful 
debtors contradicts the judgement in Income Tax Case 273.67 The advent of modern statistical 
models referred to in 2.4 have made it even less appropriate for a flat rate of 25% to be 
granted to a taxpayer. The extent of the Commissioner’s discretion and the taxpayer’s power 
to challenge that discretion will be discussed in Chapter 4.   
3.4.3 The Special Formula 
Where the nature of the taxpayer’s business is such that it is not practicable to collect a list 
of specifically identified debtors, the SARS allows the use of the special formula68 given as: 
“Y = M x N 
Where: 
Y is the calculated reserve for doubtful debts that will be allowed by the SARS; 
M is the average of bad debts written off less the bad debts recovered over a five year 
period (including the current year of assessment), expressed as a percentage of the 
annual average credit turnover (excluding cash sales) for the period; and 
N is the outstanding debtors’ balances at the close of the current year of assessment 
less the bad debts written off during that period.”  
The special formula provides a simplistic method for approximating doubtful debts. The total 
debtors at year end are multiplied by the average net bad debts over the past five years over 
the average credit sales from the past five years. There are a number of shortcomings in this 
                                                     
66 (1933) 7 SATC 232 (U) 
67 (1933) 7 SATC 232 (U) 
68 de Koker, AP., Williams, RC. 2017: 8.38 
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formula, including its inflexibility in accounting for different categories of debtors carrying 
different degrees of risk and the fact that the formula is based solely on historical information. 
It is possible that the creditworthiness of customers five years prior could be substantially 
different to the current year clients (due perhaps to a change in clientele or a downturn in 
the economy). The special formula does not take these factors into account. Current 
circumstances will take five years before they cease to have an effect on the extent of the 
doubtful debt allowance claimed.  
Additionally, the formula is tied to the amount of bad debts granted. As noted in Chapter 2.4, 
SARS may require the exhaustion of all methods of recovery before a bad debt deduction is 
granted. The rationale often given by the Commissioner is that these debts should rather be 
classified as doubtful debts resulting in a significantly decreased allowance of 25%. This strict 
application will have a knock on effect on the special formula. The nature of the formula 
means that the stricter the requirements in granting a bad debt deduction the lower the total 
doubtful debt allowance.   
3.5 Amendments to section 11(j) 
The Commissioner may be aware of the weakness of this position as an amendment to section 
11(j) proposed by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 25 of 201569 with an effective date 
to be determined by the Minister of Finance in the Gazette70 which will replace the reference 
to the Commissioner’s discretion with a set of rules to be followed in calculating the doubtful 
debt allowance. The proposed wording reads as follows:  
“11. General deductions allowed in determination of taxable income. – For the 
purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on 
any trade, there shall be allowed as deductions from the income of such person so 
derived-    
(j) an allowance as may be made each year in respect of so much on any debt due to 
the taxpayer as is considered doubtful according to criteria set out in this regard in a 
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70 Date not yet determined. 
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public notice issued by the Commissioner, if that debt would have been allowed as a 
deduction under any other provisions of this Part had that debt become bad: Provided 
that such allowance shall be included in the income of the taxpayer in the following 
year of assessment71;” 
The Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2015 did not contain 
any reference to the amendment to section 11(j). The proposed amendment may release the 
Commissioner from the burden of applying their mind by implementing a more formulaic 
approach governed by strict predetermined parameters.  However, the substitution of a 
discretionary approach for a set of inflexible rules will not provide sufficient relief for 
taxpayers. The criteria have not yet been published so it is not yet possible to pass judgement. 
It is likely that any published criteria will include an opportunity to make presentations to the 
Commissioner supporting an alternative basis for the doubtful debt allowance much like the 
clause included in the Letter to the Banking Association of South Africa on the Treatment of 
Doubtful Debts dated 17 February 2012 (refer to Annexure A).  
3.6 Conclusion 
No definition of a doubtful debt is provided by the Act. The ordinary meaning of the word 
indicates that a doubtful debt is a debt which is less certain to be recovered than a bad debt. 
The appropriate time to determine whether a debt is doubtful is upon submission of the tax 
return for that year of assessment. The interpretation of the proper manner in which to apply 
the doubtful debt allowance was settled during a time where it was sufficient to provide 
taxpayers with the opportunity to identify specific debtors in danger of defaulting on their 
commitments. It was of no concern whether a debt was bad or doubtful; the same section 
governed both situations. The lack of a need to differentiate between the two terms led to 
the terms being used imprecisely and in some places interchangeably. While Income Tax Act 
No. 58 of 1962 was introduced and the two terms split into separate sections, the case law 
providing the interpretations of the terms bad and doubtful debts remained largely the same; 
                                                     
71 Proposed amendment: Para. (j) to be substituted by s. 18(1)(i) of Act No. 25 of 2015 with effect from a date 
determined by the Minister of Finance in the Gazette. 
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imprecise all-encompassing pronouncements of a judiciary who had had no need to create a 
firm dividing line.  
At the same time, advances in financial management practices have provided taxpayers with 
more accurate predictions of future defaulters. Despite this increase in accuracy, the 25% 
default allowance remains despite case law requiring the Commissioner apply their mind. 
Finally, it was noted that the amendment to section 11(j) aims to establish criteria against 
which doubtful debts will be judged. At the time of writing no indication has been provided 
as to what these criteria might be. 
 
 




4 The Discretion of the Commissioner and the Taxpayer’s Rights to Dispute 
4.1 Introduction 
Due to the inability of static legislation to account for the myriad complexities which arise in 
practice, a degree of discretion is sometimes granted to those required to implement the law. 
“A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leaves him 
free to make a choice among possible causes of action or inaction.”72 [my emphasis] 
Section 11(j) is one such section where a public officer is given the freedom to make a choice 
between possible responses. The Act contains no indication of how the allowance should be 
determined. This chapter considers the remedies available to the taxpayer who wishes to 
dispute a determination made by the Commissioner in the light of the three most relevant 
pieces of legislation: the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996 (“the 
Constitution”), the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) and the Tax 
Administration Act No. 28 of 2011 (“TAA”).   
4.2 The constitutional right to just administrative action 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Legislation which contradicts the Constitution 
may be declared unconstitutional and void either in whole or in part.73 Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA: In re: ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 
(2) SA 674 (CCC) held that the judicial review of public power must flow from the Constitution.  
“The common law principles that previously provided the grounds for judicial review 
of public power have been subsumed under the Constitution, and in so far as they 
might continue to be relevant to judicial review, they gain their force from the 
Constitution.”74 
                                                     
72 Davis, KC.: 1972 
73 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996: Section 2 
74Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re: ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 
(2) SA 674 (CCC) para 33 
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The exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion must therefore be aligned to the values of the 
Constitution. Contained within the Constitution is the Bill of Rights, “the principal source of 
substantive constraints on public power.”75 And within the Bill of Rights is the right to just 
administrative action: 
“Section 33 (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has 
the right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and 
(2) and  
(c) promote efficient administration.” 
It is only in exceptional cases that this right to just administrative action is relied upon as a 
free-standing concept. Section 33(3) of the Constitution calls for national legislation to be 
enacted to give effect to the right to just administrative action and in the vast majority of 
circumstances that legislation will be the avenue through which administrative justice will find 
effect.  
4.3 The Tax Administration Act 
The primary expression of administrative justice in the field of tax law is the TAA. Section 3(4) 
of the Income Tax Act sets out a list of ‘decisions’ which are subject to Chapter 9 of the TAA. 
Included in that list are decisions made under section 11(j), that is, the granting of a doubtful 
debt allowance. Chapter 9 Part B of the TAA sets out the procedural steps to be taken when 
objecting to a decision made by the Commissioner. The TAA details the timing and form of 
each step in an objection process culminating in an appeal to the tax court.76  
                                                     
75 Currie, I., de Waal, J. 2005: 23 
76 TAA: Section 107 (1) and Section 115 
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Section 129(2) of the TAA makes available three remedies to the tax court in such an appeal: 
“(a) confirm the assessment or ‘decision’; 
(b) order the assessment or ‘decision’ to be altered; or 
(c) refer the assessment back to SARS for further examination and assessment.” 
There is some uncertainty as to whether the court is entitled to alter a decision made by the 
Commissioner where the Commissioner has properly applied their mind.77 When a taxpayer 
takes a ‘decision’ on appeal to a tax court, the tax court does not function as a court of appeal, 
but rather as a court of review.78 In CIR v Da Costa 1986 (3) SA 768 (A)79 it was held that as 
the Tax Court is a court of revision it follows that:  
“in cases involving the exercise of a discretion by the Commissioner, which is taken to 
the Special Court on appeal, it is called on to exercise its own original discretion.”80 
This is in direct contrast to the ruling in Income Tax Case 129581 where it was held that where 
the Commissioner has made a bona fide exercise of their discretion the Tax Court would only 
be entitled to interfere where that exercise of discretion was unreasonable.  It is submitted 
that the correct approach would be to follow the High Court ruling put forward in CIR v Da 
Costa82 that a Special Court, such as a tax court, is required to exercise its own discretion and 
should not pay special deference to the decision made by the Commissioner, even where the 
Commissioner has applied their mind. A Tax Court reviewing an exercise of discretion may 
also consider facts which had not previously been considered by the Commissioner as was 
noted in CSARS v Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 341 (SCA): 
                                                     
77 It should be kept in mind that section 102 of the TAA places the burden of proving a decision made by the 
Commissioner is incorrect on the taxpayer. 
78 Rand Ropes (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1944 AD 142, 13 SATC 1. 
79 1986 (3) SA 768 (A) at 774. 
80 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Costa (14/1984) [1985] ZASCA 32; [1985] 2 All SA 335 (A) (24 May 1985) 
quoted with approval Rand Ropes (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1944 AD 142 in turn quoting with 
approval Baily v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1933 AD 220. 
81 1983 42 SATC 19 
82 1986 (3) SA 768 (A) 
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“Unlike the position obtaining in Special Court where a decision is given on facts which 
may not have been considered by the Commissioner, this Court hears an appeal from 
a Special Court on the record of the proceedings in that Court.” [my emphasis] 
Should the matter be taken on appeal to the High Court or beyond, other principles would 
apply. The High Court is always entitled to interfere with the Tax Court’s decision where the 
Tax Court was biased in its judgement, did not act for substantial reason or had “exercised its 
decision capriciously or upon a wrong principle.”83 However, the further powers of an appeal 
court depend on the whether the discretion exercised was broad or narrow. 
The distinction between broad and narrow discretions was covered in Media Workers 
Association of SA v Press Corporation of SA 1992 (4) SA 791 (A),84 cited with approval and 
applied in MTN Service Provider (Pty) Ltd v Afro Call (Pty) Ltd [2007] SCA 97 (RSA).85 A narrow 
or strict discretion is a choice between different alternatives, while a broad or loose discretion 
involves consideration of a number of different factors. Where the discretion is a discretion 
in the broad or loose sense, the powers available to the court of appeal are less constrained. 
The court of appeal will have “a wider scope…for the matter to be reconsidered on the 
merits”,86 while a strict discretion will be unassailable unless the decision was based on 
incorrect facts or legal principles.87  
It is submitted that the discretion afforded to the Commissioner is a broad discretion and the 
reticence to interfere with the Commissioner’s allowance demonstrated in cases such as 
Income Tax Case 9388 and Income Tax Case 27389 is now ill-founded. Tax Courts and High 
Courts may consider the merits of the allowance awarded and may substitute that allowance 
                                                     
83 ex parte Neethling 1951 (4) SA 331 (A) at 335 
84 1992 (4) SA 791 (A): 796H-I and 800E-G 
85 [2007] SCA 97 (RSA): 11 
86 [2007] SCA 97 (RSA) 
87 Giddey NO v JC Barnard & Partners 2007 (2) BCLR 125 (cc): [22] 
88 (1927) 3 SATC 239(U) 
89 (1933) 7 SATC 232(U) 
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with an amount they determine. The principles against which the allowance granted must be 
evaluated are considered in 3.4.  
4.4 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act  
PAJA is the means by which the constitutional right to just administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair flows in terms of general administrative law. Each of these 
requirements will be considered further in the context of PAJA.  
PAJA is applicable to “administrative actions.” “Administrative actions” are defined as  
“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by- 
An organ of state, when- 
… (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation; or …” 
PAJA defines decisions as “decisions of an administrative nature.” The PAJA definition of 
administrative action explicitly excludes “the legislative functions of Parliament, a provincial 
legislature or a municipal council” and “the judicial functions of a judicial officer of a court.”90  
It is submitted that decisions of an administrative nature are decisions connected to the day-
to-day implementation of legislative policy and the formation of policy within the framework 
allowed by primary legislation. Therefore the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in 
both determining whether a debt is doubtful and in determining the extent of the allowance 
will qualify as decisions of an administrative nature.  
The decision must be undertaken in terms of an empowering provision. The term 
“empowering provision” means “a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or an 
agreement, instrument or other document in terms of which an administrative action is 
purportedly taken.” The Income Tax Act would constitute a law in terms of which an 
administrative action is taken.91 
                                                     
90 PAJA: definition of ‘administrative action’ (b) (dd) and (ee) 
91 Regulations issued by the Commissioner under an empowering provision would also constitute administrative 
action. This is the view expressed in Minister of Health and McIntyre NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC): “It is true that the making of regulations is not referred to in subparagraphs (a) to 
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4.4.1 Procedural Fairness 
PAJA enshrines the requirement that administrative action be procedurally fair in section 3(1): 
 “3. Procedurally fair administrative action affecting any person 
(1) Administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or 
legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair.” 
The disallowance by the Commissioner of a deduction claimed by the taxpayer would have an 
adverse effect on the taxpayer’s rights and would thus be required to be “procedurally fair.” 
What procedural fairness entails is dependent on the circumstances of each case.92 It includes 
- but is not limited to - adequate notice, reasonable opportunity for representations, a clear 
statement of administrative action, adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal 
and adequate notice of the right to request reasons for a decision.93  This dissertation will not 
consider the requirement of procedural fairness further, as this dissertation is not concerned 
with how SARS interacts with the taxpayer, but rather with how SARS is required to determine 
the extent of the allowance. 
4.4.2 Lawfulness 
Lawfulness is the requirement that the decisions of an administrator be in line with the law 
and should be supported by authority in law. Decisions made outside of the law will be 
invalid.94 PAJA gives expression to the concept of lawfulness by detailing in section 6 grounds, 
specific and general which would enable judicial review.95 The exercise of the discretion 
granted by section 11(j) would constitute lawful action.   
                                                     
(f). But the reference in the main part of the definition to “any decision of an administrative nature” and in the 
general provision of subparagraph (g) to “doing or refusing to do any other act or thing of an administrative 
nature” brings the making of regulations within the scope of the definition.” Both the exercise of a discretion by 
the Commissioner as well as Regulations issued by SARS (as in the amendment to section 11(j) would therefore 
constitute administrative action. 
92 PAJA: section 3 (2)(a) 
93 PAJA: section 3 (2)(b) 
94 Currie, I., de Waal, J. 2005: 672 




The concept of constitutional reasonableness was considered in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) 490 (CC) where Judge 
O’Reagan said:   
 “Often a power will identify a goal to be achieved, but will not dictate which route 
should be followed to achieve that goal. In such circumstances a court should pay due 
respect to the route selected by the decision-maker. This does not mean however that 
where the decision is one which will not reasonably result in the achievement of the 
goal or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not reasonable in the light of 
the reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision. A court should not 
rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the complexity of the 
decision or the identity of the decision-maker.”96 [my emphasis] 
For a decision to be reasonable it must therefore be supported by facts and result in the 
achievement of the goal of the legislation. The constitutional right to administrative action 
which is “reasonable” finds expression in two separate sections of PAJA, section 6(2)(f)(ii) and 
section 6(2)(h). These subsections are set out below: 
“6(2) a court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if- 
(f) The action itself 
(ii) is not rationally connected to-  
(aa) the purpose for which it was taken; 
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; 
(cc) the information before the administrator; or  
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator  
… 
(h) the exercise of the power or the performance of the function authorised by the 
empowering provision, in pursuance of which the administrative action was 
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purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so 
exercised the power or performed the function” 
The presence of two separate subsections, the first dealing with rationality and the second 
with reasonability, contributes to the view that rationality and reasonability are conceptually 
distinct. This does not, however, mean that there is no overlap between the two tests.  
Rationality refers to the “connection made by the administrative decision-maker between the 
material properly available to him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at.”97 The 
existence of rationality is a low bar to clear as the Commissioner need only prove that there 
was a link between the information available and the conclusion reached, absent of any 
consideration of proportionality. Reasonableness includes the concept of proportionality not 
found in rationality.98 Where any administrative action is not made rationally or reasonably a 
court may review that action in terms of PAJA. The section 11(j) allowance must therefore be 
rationally and reasonably connected to the purpose of the section. The allowance granted 
must be rationally connected to the purpose of providing relief to the taxpayer who is taxed 
on amounts which may not be received. The allowance granted must also have a degree of 
proportionality. It is submitted that this means that where courts evaluate the content of a 
decision to award a doubtful debt allowance made by the Commissioner the court must 
ensure that that decision was reasonable. Reasonableness, it is submitted, means that the 
allowance must, as far as possible, equate to historical rates of recovery. Where the provision 
for doubtful debts established by the taxpayer has proven over time to be accurate or 
conservative it is submitted that it would be reasonable for the Commissioner to grant an 
allowance equivalent to that provision. Where circumstances differ from prior periods the 
Commissioner would be entitled to reduce the allowance granted by a reasonable amount. 
What is reasonable depends on the factual situation of the taxpayer.  
4.5 Conclusion 
                                                     
97 Carephone v Marcus NO and others (JA52/98) [1998] ZALAC 11 (1 September 1998): 37, confirmed in Sidumo 
v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 (2) BCLR 158 (CC) 
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The Constitutional right to just administrative action requires any exercise of discretion to be 
procedurally fair, lawful and reasonable. The TAA provides the means by which a taxpayer 
may challenge a discretionary decision made by the Commissioner.  Chapter 9 of the TAA sets 
out the steps to be taken when appealing a decision such as that made by the Commissioner 
in section 11(j). The Tax Court and the High Court have the power to alter the decision of the 
Commissioner.  
The exercise of the discretion in section 11(j) is an administrative action and is subject to PAJA. 
PAJA provides expression to the Constitutional right to just administrative action. In 
evaluating the allowance granted by the Commissioner, the courts must evaluate the decision 
in terms of whether that action is procedurally fair, lawful and reasonable.  
The discretion will be procedurally fair where the requirements of the TAA have been 
followed. The discretion will be lawful where it was exercised in terms of the Income Tax Act. 
The discretion is reasonable where it is rationally connected to the purpose of the section and 
contains an element of proportionality. A section 11(j) allowance should therefore provide 
relief for taxpayers taxed on amounts which may not be received and that relief should, where 
possible, be proportional to the actual amount of revenue not received. In many instances 





5 The BASA Directive: An example of the Commissioner’s discretion 
5.1 Introduction 
On 17 February 2012 SARS issued a letter to the Chairman of the Banking Association of South 
Africa (“The Directive”). The Directive was sent with the intention of setting out the manner 
in which the Commissioner will exercise the discretion afforded them in section 11(j) of the 
Income Tax Act as it relates to banks. The Directive is applicable only to banks. However, in 
detailing how the Commissioner intends to apply the discretion granted by section 11(j) to 
banks in particular, the Directive is one of the few public documents to elucidate the 
Commissioner’s interpretation of the general principles of section 11(j) applicable to all 
taxpayers. The Directive also provides insight into the Commissioner’s understanding of the 
interaction between section 11(j) and the International Accounting Standard (in particular 
International Accounting Standard 39 – Financial Instruments: Measurement and Recognition 
(“IAS 39”).  
The Directive will be superseded by the inclusion of section 11(jA) in the Income Tax Act99 and 
the IAS 39 will be replaced by International Financial Reporting Standards 9 – Financial 
Instruments (“IFRS 9”100). Nevertheless, the Directive highlights the Commissioner’s 
understanding of the workings of the Commissioner’s discretion in section 11(j) and the 
interaction of accounting standards with section 11(j) both of which will continue to be 
applicable to all taxpayers.  
This chapter seeks to use the methodology put forward by SARS in the Directive to investigate 
the interpretation of section 11(j) taken by SARS and whether it finds accord with our 
understanding of the section gleaned from the principles of legal interpretation and South 
African case law as set out in the preceding chapters of this dissertation. This chapter 
discusses the content of the Directive and its relation to these legal principles. The chapter 
then discusses the proposed section 11(jA) which will take the place of the Directive in 
                                                     
99 Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 17 of 2017: section 19. The section came into effect on 1 January 2018 and 
applies in respect of years of assessment commencing on or after that date.  
100 IFRS 9 has an effective date of 1 January 2018 and applies to years starting on or after that date. 
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regulating the doubtful debts of the banking industry. This amendment is the first legislative 
response to the change to IFRS 9.  
5.2 The Directive 
The Directive is a letter to the Chairman of the Banking Association of South Africa and is 
applicable only to banks. The Directive sets out the manner in which banks must calculate 
doubtful debt allowances in order for the allowances to be accepted by the Commissioner. 
Despite being applicable only to banks, the Directive provides insight into the Commissioner’s 
interpretation of the general principles applicable to all taxpayers calculating doubtful debt 
allowances. 
5.2.1 Introduction  
In the introductory paragraphs, the Commissioner states that the reason for the issue of the 
Directive is to detail the “manner in which the Commissioner will exercise the discretion 
contained in section 11(j) … as far as it relates to banks.”101 After stating the purpose of the 
Directive, the Commissioner delves into what is the primary concern of the Directive, the 
interaction between the Accounting Standard and the Income Tax Act:    
“It is recognized that section 11(j) makes provision for an allowance for debtors in 
general and not only debtors, the amounts of which, were previously included in 
income. This creates a beneficial position. As a general rule any special dispensation 
must be applied strictly and monitored closely and should be limited to make 
provision only in circumstances where it can be reasonably determined that the debt 
is truly doubtful or the loss has in fact already been incurred on a particular debt or 
portfolio of debts and only to the extent that the loss, if written off in the future, will 
qualify for deduction.” [my emphasis]  
It is likely that the Directive is here referring to the following statement in Ernst v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 19 SATC 1: 
                                                     
101 The BASA Directive: 1 
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“The Courts, in dealing with taxing Acts, will not presume in favour of any special 
privilege of exemption from taxation. Said Lord Young in Hogg v Parochial Board of 
Auchtermuchty… ‘I think it proper to say that, in dubio, I should deem it the duty of the 
Court to reject any construction of a modern statute which implied the extension of 
a class privilege of exemption from taxation, provided the language reasonably 
admitted of another interpretation.” 102 [my emphasis] 
It is submitted that, where interpreting legislation, it is no longer a general rule that a special 
dispensation be applied strictly. Instead, the legislation should be interpreted based on the 
ordinary wording and the context of the section.103 The Directive is therefore incorrect where 
it states that the allowance should be strictly interpreted. The Directive continues: 
In this regard the International Reporting Standard (“IAS 39”) seeks to determine the 
appropriate credit provision for accounting purposes. This provision is to be based on 
objective evidence of a past event (or events) that represents an “incurred loss” (or 
losses). The standard requires an assessment of what has actually occurred, rather 
than either future events or all eventualities.”104[my emphasis]  
The difference between “circumstances where it can reasonably be determined that the debt 
is truly doubtful or the loss has in fact already been incurred” from the first quote, which the 
Commissioner states is required by section 11(j) and the “incurred loss” required by IAS 39 in 
the quote above, is the crux of the Directive.  
5.2.2 Financial accounting for credit provisions 
The next subheading of the Directive describes IAS 39, the three types of impairment 
provisions used by banks (incurred but not reported (“IBNR”), portfolio specific impairments 
(“PSI”) and specific impairments) and the extent to which each of these categories reflect 
debts which are doubtful. The impairment in IAS 39 is based on “incurred loss events105”, 
                                                     
102 The BASA Directive: 3 
103 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) 
104 The BASA Directive: 3 
105 IAS 39: 63 
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objectively observable occurrences which affect the recoverability of a financial asset. When 
an incurred loss is identified the future cash flows are estimated and the carrying value of the 
asset is reduced. These estimations will require the entity to make a subjective assertion as 
to the extent of future cash flows. The extent to which anticipated losses can be attributed to 
a specific debt or subset of debts is the basis for the three impairment provision types.  
IBNR losses are losses for which objective evidence of an impairment event exists, but there 
is as yet no objective evidence of the impact of that impairment event at account level. The 
taxpayer has no way to accurately determine the amount of losses incurred and an estimate 
of the loss must therefore be made. Where a financial asset has not been found to be 
individually impaired, that asset is grouped together with other financial assets of similar 
credit characteristics and the impairment loss estimated for the group as a collective.106 
Under IAS 39, the IBNR allowance, even on the collective level, requires the existence of an 
incurred loss. Foreseeable credit losses unsupported by objective evidence are not disclosed 
on the financial statements and do not form part of an entities impairment losses.107 
Statistical models, such as the Markov Chains mentioned in 2.4, may be employed in order to 
determine the total IBNR losses for the period.  
PSI losses are anticipated losses on loans for which objective evidence of the impairment of 
that loan is now present, but where the loan has not yet gone into default.  
Specific impairment losses are anticipated losses on loans for which objective evidence of the 
impairment of that loan is present and where the loan is in default or close to being in default.  
All categories of impairment therefore result from objective evidence of a loss event in terms 
of IAS 39. Objective evidence is described in IAS 39 paragraph 59.108 
                                                     
106 IAS 39: 64 
107 IAS 39: 63 
108 “Objective evidence that a financial asset or group of assets is impaired includes observable data that comes 
to the attention of the holder of the asset about the following loss events: (a) significant financial difficulty of the 
issuer or obligor; (b) a breach of contract, such as a default or delinquency in interest or principal payments; (c)  
the lender, for economic or legal reasons relating to the borrower’s financial difficulty, granting to the borrower 
a concession that the lender would not otherwise consider; (d) it becoming probable that the borrower will enter 
bankruptcy or other financial reorganisation; (e) the disappearance of an active market for that financial asset 
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Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the BASA Directive set out SARS’ objection to the accounting 
methodology detailed in the IAS 39.  
“Whilst IAS 39 sets out a sound accounting methodology for purposes of determining 
a more accurate provision for doubtful debts from an “incurred loss” perspective”, the 
term “incurred loss” has a different meaning from an income tax point of 
view.”109[my emphasis] 
Our courts have made sure to emphasise a distinction between accounting principles and the 
interpretation of the Act. Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Limited v CSARS 2012 (5) SA 363 SCA 
quoted with approval Secretary for Inland Revenue v Eaton Hall (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 953 
which had stated that:  
“accounting practice cannot override the correct interpretation of the provisions of the 
Act and their application to the facts of the matter.”110 
The Directive follows this separation of accounting and tax law and distinguishes between an 
“incurred loss” for accounting purposes and for tax purposes. While it is not clear from the 
Directive as to the reason the term “incurred loss” is discussed, the term not appearing in 
section 11(j), it may be that the Commissioner is indicating that while the presence of an 
“incurred loss” is a requirement for an IAS 39 impairment, that “incurred loss” should not be 
equated with “losses actually incurred” referred to in section 11(a). It is submitted that SARS 
is merely stating that acceptance that an amount meets the requirements of IAS 39 does not 
                                                     
because of financial difficulties; or (f) observable data indicating that there is a measurable decrease in the 
estimated future cash flows from a group of financial assets since the initial recognition of those assets, although 
the decrease cannot yet be identified with the individual financial assets in the group, including: (i) adverse 
changes in the payment status in the payment status of borrowers in the group (e.g. an increased number of 
delayed payments or an increased number of credit card borrowers who have reached their credit limit and are 
paying the minimum monthly amount); or (ii) national or local economic conditions that correlate with defaults 
on the assets in the group ((e.g. an increase in the unemployment rate in the geographical area of the borrowers, 
a decrease in property prices for mortgages in the relevant area, a decrease in oil prices for loan assets to oil 
producers, or adverse changes in industry conditions that affect the borrowers in the group).” 
109 The BASA Directive: 23 
110 2012 (5) SA 363 (SCA): 35 
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mean that it would also meet the requirements of section 11(a). It is submitted that this is 
correct. 
5.2.3 Income tax legislation: Section 11(j) and SARS practice: past 
The Directive quotes section 11(j) and refers to SARS’ practice before the issue of the 
Directive. The Directive refers to a “general practice … that allows taxpayers to claim 25% of 
a list the doubtful as an allowance [sic].”111 Previous SARS’ practice was to allow a 
“substantially higher provision on debts considered by the bank as bad and irrecoverable 
although not yet written off or removed from the banking systems.”112 The debts on which 
this substantially higher doubtful debt provision were claimed had to have been “considered 
by the bank, on bona fide grounds, to be bad and irrecoverable in terms of internal audit, 
external audit and other procedures. The percentage was determined based on, but not 
limited to, past recovery rates.”113 The following two points should be highlighted: 
 An allowance greater than 25% 
The mere fact that an allowance of 25% of listed doubtful debts has become general practice 
does not mean that such an approach is supported by legislation or case law. To the contrary, 
courts have rejected the blanket application of an allowance of 25% of listed doubtful debts 
where the Commissioner has not considered the specific circumstances of the taxpayer.114 It 
is submitted that the Commissioner’s previous approach of granting to a taxpayer bank an 
allowance based on the taxpayer’s past recovery rates and other relevant information meets 
the requirement set out in Income Tax Case 273115 that there be an application of the 
Commissioner’s mind to the specific facts of the taxpayer’s situation. It is submitted that this 
approach is the correct approach for all taxpayers. 
                                                     
111 The BASA Directive: 20 
112 The BASA Directive: 20 
113 The BASA Directive: 21 
114 Income Tax Case 273 (1933) 7 SATC 232 (U) 
115 (1933) 7 SATC 232 (U) 
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 “Not yet written off or removed from the banking debt systems” 
In my opinion, the assertion by the Commissioner that “a substantially higher provision” is 
only justified where the debt is “considered by the bank, on bona fide grounds to be bad and 
irrecoverable” is less theoretically sound. It is submitted that where a debt has been 
determined to be bad and irrecoverable, it should more properly be claimed as a bad debt 
under section 11(i). However, it appears that SARS is of the opinion that a bad debt must be 
“written off or removed from the banking debt systems” before it may be claimed as a bad 
debt. It is submitted that this approach is incorrect. As discussed in 2.3 there are no specific 
requirements which must be met before a debt may be written off as bad. It is submitted that 
whether a debt has been written off in the accounts or removed from the banking system of 
the taxpayer is merely a factor which must be considered when determining whether or not 
a debt is bad. 
5.2.4 SARS Practice: Effective 2011 year of assessment 
It was noted in the introductory paragraphs that accounting and tax principles are 
conceptually different. Nevertheless, considering that it is impracticable for the 
Commissioner to evaluate the individual doubtful debt allowances of each taxpayer, the 
Commissioner details their intention to use IAS 39 as the starting point for their evaluation of 
doubtful debts:    
“…in order to facilitate a practical solution, the Commissioner will use the discretion, 
as provided in section 11(j), in adjusting the IAS 39 impairment for tax purposes…In 
principle, the greater the extent of estimation involved in computing the IAS 39 
provision, the greater is the subjectivity and hence the lower is the amount of such IAS 
39 allowance that the Commissioner could then expect to permit for tax purposes.”116  
The above quote highlights the interaction between the impairment provision created by IAS 
39 and the impairment allowance granted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner states 
that they are adopting a “more conservative approach in establishing appropriate 
                                                     
116 The BASA Directive: 24 
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percentages”117 to be used in calculating the allowance. The reason given by the 
Commissioner for the caution shown when approaching the taxpayers’ estimation is the 
inherent subjectivity in making those estimations:  
“Factors taken into account include mainly the degree of subjectivity required by 
banks in estimating future expected cash flows, such as identifying macroeconomic 
events and associating these with incurred losses at a portfolio level, identifying the 
relevant objective evidence of impairment, together with the potential errors in 
judgement and the need for mathematical assumptions.”118 [my emphasis] 
It is therefore more appropriate to say that the Commissioner’s percentage adjusts for an 
expected inaccuracy, “the potential errors of judgement and the need for mathematical 
assumptions”, of the taxpayer’s estimation. The rate of allowance granted for each category 
of debts is as follows: 
“27.1 25% of the IBNR impairment provision; 
27.2 80% of the PSI and specific impairment provision; 
27.3 100% of the specific impairment provision provided a valid and accurate split can 
be distinguished from the PSI provision.”119 
This approach is defensible where it is possible for the taxpayer to provide support to the 
Commissioner for the taxpayer’s doubtful debt calculation and to then be granted a more 
favourable allowance. This opportunity to motivate for a different allowable percentage 
“based on evidence from past experience” is provided for by paragraph 25 of the Directive. 
Without this opportunity for the taxpayer to present the individual facts and circumstances 
of their specific situation, any prescribed amendments to an already existing standard would 
be just as mechanistic and inappropriate as the direct adoption of an accounting standard. 
The Commissioner would not have applied their mind unless the individual facts and 
circumstances of the taxpayer have been reviewed. Where a taxpayer does not bring forward 
                                                     
117 The BASA Directive: 26 
118 The BASA Directive: 26 
119 The BASA Directive: 27 
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supporting information the Commissioner is justified in accepting this as tacit admission that 
no such facts and circumstances exist. By setting out the general approach to be followed, 
but allowing deviations from this approach where appropriately supported, it is submitted 
that the Commissioner has correctly applied the discretion in section 11(j).  
While it is not explicitly stated in section 11(j), by relying on IAS 39 the Commissioner asserts 
their opinion that a debt must have suffered a loss event before a doubtful debt allowance 
may be claimed. Where a loss event is required statistical models and reference to industry 
norms will not be sufficient evidence to support that a debt is doubtful. This approach has 
support in case law.  Income Tax Case 93120 (discussed at 2.2.4) requires that each debtor be 
considered on its own facts and that the mere fact that the taxpayer operates in an industry 
with a high percentage of default on debts is not sufficient evidence on which to claim a 
doubtful debt allowance. It is submitted that this approach is no longer appropriate given the 
increased accuracy of statistical models. The introduction, of IFRS 9, an accounting standard 
in which no loss event is required before impairment takes place will introduce uncertainty 
as to whether the Commissioner still requires a loss event before a doubtful debt allowance 
is granted. The impact of IFRS 9 is discussed in Chapter 6. 
The Directive also specifically excludes the time value of money when calculating the doubtful 
debt allowance.  
5.2.5 Suspended interest and general  
The Directive states that suspended interest will form part of a taxpayer’s gross income and 
will be subject to the calculation of the doubtful debt allowance detailed above. All consumer 
debts are subject to the National Credit Act No. 34 of 2005 (“the National Credit Act”). It is a 
requirement of the National Credit Act that where payments have been received by the 
taxpayer those payments must first be allocated to interest before it is allocated to the 
principal debt.121 Where interest will be levied on a debt which has been classified as doubtful 
                                                     
120 (1927) 3 SATC 239 (U) 
121 National Credit Act No. 34 of 2005: section 126 (3) A credit provider must credit each payment made under a 
credit agreement to the consumer as of the date of receipt of the payment, as follows: (a) Firstly, to satisfy any 
due or unpaid interest charges; (b) secondly, to satisfy any due or unpaid fees or charges; and (c) thirdly, to reduce 
the amount of the principal debt.  
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the application of the National Credit Act may have a considerable impact on the calculation 
of doubtful debt. 
As an example, consider a loan the principal value of which is R100, payable in two years’ time 
and on which interest of 10% will be levied. It is anticipated that future cash flows will total 
R100. It may appear that the loan is not currently doubtful. The current principal value of the 
loan is equal to the expected future cash flows. However, if the requirements of the National 
Credit Act are taken into account it becomes clear that the principal debt held by the taxpayer 
at year end will not be recovered. 
Table 3: Example of interest accruing to a debt 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 
Interest Accrued - 10 5 
Payments Received - 58 42 
Principal Debt 100 52 15 
Expected Recovery 100 42 0 
 
At the end of year 1 interest of R10 has accrued to the taxpayer and has been included as 
taxable income. Let us assume that debtor makes payments totalling R58. In terms of the 
National Credit those payments would first be applied to the R10 interest. The remaining R48 
would only then be applied to the principal debt. At the end of year 1 the principal debt is 
therefore R52 and expected future cash flows are R42. A doubtful debt allowance of R10 may 
therefore be claimed in year 1. 
In year 2 interest of R5 will accrue to the taxpayer and be included in their taxable income. As 
expected the debtor makes payments of only R42. These payments are applied first to interest 
leaving R37 to be applied to the principal debt. At the end of year the unimpaired principal 
debt amounts to R5 and future cash flows are R0. A doubtful debt allowance of R5 may 
therefore be claimed in year 2.  
From the above example it is clear that a simple comparison of the outstanding principal debt 
and the expected cash flows is an insufficient estimation of the expected losses. The future 
losses identified at the end of year 0 were only claimed in year 1 and year 2 despite no 
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deviations in the expected future cash flow occurring. It is an unnecessary burden that the 
taxpayer who has already paid tax on the full R100 is unable to claim relief where objective 
evidence indicates a pattern of payment which will fail to recover the full debt.  
It is certainly true that the interest in the above example has not yet accrued to the taxpayer 
and is therefore not a “debt due.” The interest is therefore not eligible for the doubtful debt 
allowance. However it is submitted that the estimated cash flows attributable to the primary 
debt cannot include amounts which in terms of the National Credit Act must be applied to 
interest. Those cash flows can therefore not be used to determine whether a debt has 
become doubtful. 
5.3 Section 11(jA) 
The method by which the Commissioner exercises his Directive will be replaced by section 
11(jA). The new section is quoted in full below: 
“(jA) notwithstanding paragraph (j), an allowance equal to 25 per cent of the loss 
allowance relating to impairment, as contemplated in IFRS 9, if the person is a covered 
person as determined by applying the criteria in paragraphs (c)(i) to (iii) of the 
definition of covered person in section 24JB(1): Provided that the allowance must be 
increased to 85 per cent of so much of that loss allowance relating to impairment as is 
equal to the amount that is in default, as determined by applying the criteria in 
paragraphs (a)(iii) to (vi) and (b) of the definition of ‘default’ as defined in Regulation 
67 of the regulations issued in terms of section 90 of the Banks Act (contained in 
Government Notice No. R.1029 published in Government Gazette No. 35950 of 12 
December 2012): Provided that the allowance must be included in the income of that 
person in the following year of assessment.” 
The Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the 2017 Taxation Law Amendment Bill of 19 July 
2017 (“the Memorandum”) makes it clear that the introduction of section 11(jA) is due to the 
replacement of the IAS 39 incurred loss model with the IFRS 9 expected credit loss model. The 
Memorandum states that the impairment requirements under IFRS 9 are “determined on a 
significantly different basis from those under IAS 39” which the Memorandum asserts will 
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“result in significantly higher levels of impairments being recognized, particularly in stages 1 
(IBNR) and 2 (PSI).”   
In order to address this more substantial accounting provision for doubtful debts the 





Table 4: Comparison of allowances per section 11(jA) and the BASA Directive 
 Allowances per 
proposed section 
11(jA) 
 Allowances per 
BASA Directive 




Debtors measured at lifetime 
expected credit losses, but 
not in default. 
40% PSI Provision 85% 
Debtors in “default”122 85% SI Provision 100% 
 
The new section 11(jA) does not provide the Commissioner with a discretion to determine the 
extent of a doubtful debt allowance. It is submitted that section 11(jA) would not constitute 
administrative action and would thus not be subject to the requirements of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act. Section (jA) is not subject to section 117 (3) of the TAA.  The 
proposed amendments come into effect on 1 January 2018 and will apply in respect of years 
of assessment commencing on or after that date. The removal of a Commissioner’s discretion 
is one response to the impact of IFRS 9. Other possible responses are discussed in 6.4. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Although the Directive is applicable only to banks it provides insight into the Commissioner’s 
understanding of the mechanics of section 11(j) and an indication of how the Commissioner 
will exercise their discretion in other industries. The Directive is clear in stating that the Act 
does not permit the Commissioner to substitute their discretion with an accounting standard. 
Nevertheless, because of the practical difficulty in evaluating every taxpayer’s doubtful debts, 
the Commissioner will make use of IAS 39 as the basis for their determination. By using IAS 
39 the Commissioner requires that all doubtful debts first meet the requirements of a 
doubtful debt for IAS 39 purposes. This includes the requirement that for a debt to be 
impaired there must be a “loss event.”  The Commissioner will then reduce the IAS 39 amount 
by a percentage which reflects the degree of uncertainty involved in the calculation. It is 
                                                     
122 “Default” as defined in Regulation 67 of the regulations issued in terms of section 90 of the Banks Act 
(contained in Government Notice No. R.1029 published in Government Gazette No. 35950 of 12 December 2012) 
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submitted that where the historical figures provide evidence of the accuracy of the taxpayer’s 
IAS 39 amount, the reduction applied by the Commissioner should be substantially reduced. 
The interaction between the National Credit Act and section 11(j) was considered and it was 
determined that in estimating future cash flows, payments made by a debtor would be 
attributed first to the outstanding interest and then to the capital. It would therefore not be 
appropriate to include those cash flows in the calculation of a debt’s recoverable amount. 
Section 11(j) replaces the Directive by including fixed percentages in the Act. The 
Commissioner will not apply a discretion when determining doubtful debts for covered 
institutions. This amendment was the result of the increased uncertainty in estimating 
impairment amounts brought about by IFRS 9. IFRS 9 is discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.      
60 
 
6 IFRS 9 and its impact on the allowance for doubtful debts 
6.1 Introduction 
In approaching the allowance to be granted under IAS 39 “the Commissioner has taken a more 
conservative approach.”123 The Commissioner is certainly entitled to adopt this approach as 
the wording of section 11(j) requires that the Commissioner be satisfied. In contrast to the 
Commissioner’s approach, the expected credit loss method contained in IFRS 9 is not a 
conservative method. The aim of the standard is not to restrict the recognition of financial 
assets to only the most certain of recoverable amounts, an approach which the IASB notes 
would be preferred by some interested parties. Rather, it is to fairly represent the financial 
status of the entity. This purpose is defined by the IASB in the Basis for Conclusions of IFRS 9 
as:   
“… [T]o be consistent with the Conceptual Framework, faithful representation of 
expected credit losses implies that the depiction of those credit losses is neutral and 
free from bias. The depiction of expected credit losses in an unbiased way informs the 
decisions of a broad range of users of financial statements, including regulators and 
investors and creditors. In the IASB’s view, incorporating a degree of conservatism 
would be arbitrary and would result in a lack of comparability.124”  
Where two different foundational principles are used as the basis for the calculation of an 
amount there is bound to be a degree of tension. The IASB has, in addressing the failures of 
IAS 39 to provide sufficient warning to investors during the 2008 economic crisis, has created 
a standard which is forward looking rather than one based solely on historic events. IFRS 9 is 
based on estimates of future cash flows based on receivables in the aggregate rather than 
estimates of the cash flow of a particular debt. There may be an argument that it would be 
appropriate for tax legislation to adopt a more probabilistic approach which reflects the 
likelihood that a taxpayer will not receive funds from a debt. It is submitted, however, that 
the weight of case law and the opinion of the Commissioner are not in favour of this approach.  
                                                     
123 The BASA Directive: 26 
124 IFRS 9 Basis for Conclusions: BC5.86 
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The previous financial standard, IAS 39 Financial Instruments – Recognition and 
Measurement, was criticised as called “too complex” and “inconsistent with the way entities 
manage their businesses and risks.”125 The recognition of credit losses on loans and 
receivables was said to occur too late in the credit cycle.126 It is the changes brought about by 
this last criticism that will be of most interest to the SARS and those seeking to determine the 
extent to which the SARS will allow a bad or doubtful debt allowance. The final version of the 
replacement standard, IFRS 9, was issued in July of 2014. IFRS 9 is effective for all years of 
assessment with a starting date on or after 1 January 2018, although earlier adoption was 
permitted. The new standard is not industry-specific and applies to all entities. Non-financial 
institutions will have access to a practical expedient127 which limits the amount of work 
required by the standard.  
As discussed in 5.2.2, the impairment governed by IAS 39 is based on ‘incurred losses.’ IFRS 9 
moves away from IAS 39’s “incurred loss” approach, in which an event needs to have occurred 
before an impairment may be claimed, to an ‘expected credit loss’ model. This chapter 
discusses IFRS 9 as the replacement of IAS 39 and considers the anticipated interaction 
between IFRS 9 and section 11(j).  
6.2 IFRS 9 
IFRS 9 departs from IAS 39’s ‘incurred loss’ approach, in which an event needs to have 
occurred before an impairment may be claimed, to an ‘expected credit loss’ model. ‘Expected 
loss’ is a term borrowed from the field of statistics and means the total of all losses multiplied 
by the estimated severity of each loss.128 An ‘expected credit loss’ is therefore the difference 
between cash flows due to an entity per the contract and the cash flows expected to be 
received discounted at the original effective interest rate. As no financial instrument can be 
said to have a 100% likelihood of recovery, all financial instruments will have some degree of 
                                                     
125 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2017 
126 IFRS 9 Basis for Conclusions: BC5.83  
127 Refer to 6.3.2. 
128 International Risk Management Institute: “Expected loss” 
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impairment allowance, even where there has been no observable evidence or ‘loss event’ 
pointing to a reduction in the likelihood of recovery.129  
6.2.1 The general approach 
IFRS 9 contains two approaches to the impairment of a financial instrument: the general and 
simplified approaches. Unless specifically identified, financial instruments will be subject to 
the general approach.130 In the general approach, financial instruments are subject to two 
levels of impairment. Firstly, an impairment loss is recognised when the loan or receivable is 
recorded in the accounting books of the taxpayer.131 The taxpayer should use all “reasonable 
and supportable information which is available without undue cost”132 to determine the 
expected losses to be incurred over a 12 month period.133 In allowing the use of all available 
information,134 IFRS 9 permits the entity to capture unobserved, but expected losses without 
creating a greater operational burden.  
Secondly, where a significant increase in the credit risk of the financial instrument can be 
identified at year end the expected losses to be incurred over the lifetime of the financial 
instrument will form the basis of the anticipated impairment.135 In determining whether there 
has been significant increase in credit risk all “reasonable and supportable information which 
is available without due cost” must be used.136 There is a rebuttable presumption that where 
contractual payments are more than 30 days past due, the credit risk of a financial instrument 
has increased.137 Objective evidence of an impairment is therefore not a requirement and an 
entity is not entitled to rely solely on historical information.138 While significant guidance is 
                                                     
129 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2017: 26 
130 IFRS 9: 5.5.15 
131 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2017: 29 
132 IFRS 9: 5.5.17 (c) 
133 IFRS 9:  5.5.5 
134 IFRS 9: 5.5.17 (c) 
135 IFRS 9: 5.5.3 
136 IFRS 9: 5.5.9 
137 IFRS 9: 5.5.11 
138 IFRS 9: 5.5.11 
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provided in IFRS 9 it remains clear that an assessment of whether a significant increase in 
credit risk has occurred will require the application of substantial judgement. 
6.2.2 The simplified approach 
IFRS 9 provides for a simplified approach when dealing with trade receivables, contact assets 
and lease receivables. These financial instruments are often held by entities without 
sophisticated credit risk management systems. The simplified approach eliminates the 12 
month expected credit loss calculation and the requirement to assess when a significant 
increase in credit risk has occurred. Instead, lease receivables, trade receivables and contract 
assets without a significant financing component have their loss allowance measured at initial 
recognition and over the life of the financial instrument at an amount equal to lifetime 
expected credit losses. A taxpayer may elect to measure the loss allowance trade receivables 
which do contain a significant financial component at lifetime expected credit losses upon 
recognition.139 Entities are permitted to use a provision matrix as a practical expedient for the 
calculation of lifetime expected credit losses for these financial assets.  
6.2.3 Credit adjusted method 
If at the time of purchase or origination a financial asset is considered credit-impaired the 
general impairment model will not apply. Instead the loss allowance will be calculated on the 
lifetime expected credit losses of the financial asset. However, lifetime expected credit losses 
are included in the calculation of the effective interest rate of the asset on recognition. This 
means the effective interest rate on the financial asset recognized in the accounting books of 
the entity will be lower than the effective interest rate on a financial asset with the same face 
value. Consequently, no loss allowance is created at the initial recognition of the asset. This 
method is largely consistent with paragraph AG5 of IAS 39. 
6.3 The determination of the impairment 
6.3.1 Expected credit losses  
Whether the simplified or the general approach is followed, expected losses must be 
calculated by identifying the probability of future cash flows expect in question. It is the aim 
                                                     
139 IFRS 9: 5.5.15 
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of IFRS 9 to present a “faithful representation of expected credit losses.”140 The standard 
achieves a faithful representation by requiring an entity to:  
“measure expected credit losses of a financial instrument in a way that reflects: 
a. an unbiased and probability-weighted amount that is determined by evaluating a 
range of possible outcomes; 
b. the time value of money; and 
c. reasonable and supportable information that is available without undue cost or 
effort at the reporting date about past events, current conditions and forecasts of 
future economic conditions.”141   
The standard requires the evaluation of a range of possible outcomes, however, it is not 
required that every possible scenario be considered. The standard does require at least two 
outcomes be considered, namely where a credit loss occurs and where no credit loss occurs, 
even where the possibility of credit loss occurring is “very low.”142 The complexity of this 
calculation is not prescribed by the standard and could comprise simple models or multiple 
scenarios specifying the amount and timing of various cash flows and their attendant 
probabilities. 
IFRS 9, like IAS 39, explicitly includes the time value of money in the calculation of the present 
value of future cash flows.143 The Commissioner, in the email to the Chairman of the Banking 
Association which accompanied the issue of the BASA Directive, made clear that:  
“SARS has always been in disagreement regarding the adjustment for the present 
value of future cash flows in the calculation of the allowance determined in terms of 
section 11(j) of the Income Tax Act 58 (the Act). Be that as it may, allowing a further 
deduction for the net present value of future cash flows is against the general principle 
that a deduction is only allowable for an actual loss as opposed to a “loss” on the time 
                                                     
140 IFRS 9 Basis for Conclusions: BC5.86 
141 IFRS 9: 5.5.17 
142 IFRS 9: 5.5.18 
143 IAS 39: 63 
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value of money. The allowance available in terms of section 11(j) is already a very 
favourable tax dispensation in a banking context as the debt for which an allowance is 
being claimed has generally not been included in income. Hence, to now further extend 
such allowance to incorporate deductions that are not catered for in the Act is 
unacceptable.” 
The degree of judgement required for estimates is dependent on the availability of 
information.144 The standard does not require detailed estimates of cash flows for periods far 
in the future. For such periods management may make extrapolations based on available 
detailed information. These factors combine to create an impairment standard which will 
incorporate more subjective estimates. 
6.3.2 Provision matrix 
When determining the expected credit losses on trade receivables, IFRS 9 allows for the use 
of a simplified ‘provision matrix’ as long as that provision is consistent with the general 
principles of expected loss measurement. The provision matrix is only available when the 
simplified approach is used. As such, the provision matrix is not available to financial 
institutions such as banks. The matrix uses historical default rates adjusted for forward 
looking estimates to determine the expected life of a trade receivable.145 
Table 5: Example of a Provision Matrix 






90 days or 
more past due 
Calculated Default 
rate 
0.3% 1.6% 3.6% 6.6% 10.6% 
Carrying value 15,000 7,500 4,000 2,500 1,000 
Lifetime expected 
credit loss 
45 120 144 165 106 
    
The change to the accounting standard will result in substantial changes to the manner in 
which taxpayers recognise impairments in their annual financial statements. While our courts 
                                                     
144 IFRS 9: 5.5.50. 
145 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2017: 33 
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and SARS have both stated that accounting principles cannot simply be imported wholesale 
into the determination of tax allowances,146 in the case of a provision for doubtful debts there 
remains a strong connection between the amounts recorded in the accounting records of a 
taxpayer and the amounts granted as a tax allowance. In an effort to alleviate the burden of 
investigating the doubtful debts of every taxpayer the Commissioner relies heavily on the 
accounting provision for doubtful debts.147 Where the accounting principles required the 
presence of loss event the Commissioner was able to use the amounts recorded in the 
accounting books of the taxpayer and audited by external auditors as the starting point for 
the determination of a doubtful debt allowance. It remains to be seen how the Commissioner 
will approach the process of calculating a doubtful debt allowance where the accounting basis 
has abandoned the concept of a loss event.   
6.4 Interaction with section 11(j) 
6.4.1 Consequences of IFRS 9 
Above I have noted that the application of section 11(j), as a practical matter, is directly linked 
to IAS 39, the accounting standard for financial instruments. I have further noted that IAS 39 
will soon be replaced by IFRS 9. I have noted that IFRS 9 abandons the principle of a loss event 
being a requirement for an impairment of a debt, a principle which the Commissioner believes 
to be a prerequisite for the granting of a doubtful debt allowance. Below I summarise the 
consequences of the change in financial standard and the SARS’ likely response: 
 Doubtful debt impairments will be based on a higher degree of uncertainty 
“[A]ny model that attempts to depict expected credit losses will be subject to 
measurement uncertainty.” 148  
This statement about the new impairment methodology from the IASB would presumably not 
have been well received by the SARS. The Commissioner’s approach to uncertainty was 
discussed in 5.2.4 and can be summarised as, the greater the degree of uncertainty of 
                                                     
146 See Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery Limited v CSAR 2012 (5) SA 363 (SCA) at para 35 discussed at 5.3.2. 
147 The BASA Directive: 24 “In order to facilitate a practical solution, the Commissioner will use the discretion, as 
provided for in section 11(j), in adjusting the IAS 39 impairment allowance for tax purposes.” 
148 IFRS 9 Basis for Conclusions: BC5.85 
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irrecoverability, the lower the doubtful debt allowance granted. By requiring the taxpayer to 
estimate the future tax flows on all debts regardless of whether or not a loss event has 
occurred will increase the amount of uncertainty in the calculation of doubtful debts.  
 Doubtful debt impairments will be recognised earlier 
It was the stated goal of the drafters of IFRS 9 that likely impairments be recognised sooner 
than they had been under IAS 39 in response to the criticism that IAS 39 “delayed the 
recognition of credit losses.”149 Impairments under IFRS 9 can be based on “reasonable and 
supportable information that is available without undue cost or effort about…forecasts of 
future economic conditions”150 and do not require the taxpayer to wait until there is 
“objective evidence that an impairment loss…has been incurred.” 151 The taxpayer is therefore 
required to recognise impairments earlier than they would have been under IAS 39.   
 Doubtful debt impairments will be larger 
It is the expectation of taxpayers that the application of IFRS 9 will result in the recognition of 
larger doubtful debt impairments.152 An Ernst & Young European survey found that most 
banking institutions would see their provisions increase as a result of IFRS 9.153 Perhaps more 
importantly, the Commissioner is of the opinion that the change in standard will result in 
greater loss allowances being claimed. On page 52 of the Draft Explanatory Memorandum on 
the 2017 draft Taxation Law Amendment Bill154 while providing reasons for the creation of 
section 11(jA)155 the drafters of the Bill enumerate the differences between IAS 39 and IFRS 
9. They then go on to state that:  
                                                     
149 IFRS 9 Basis for Conclusions :BC5.83 
150 IFRS 9: 5.5.17(c) 
151 IAS 39: 63 
152 Ernst & Young, 2011: 15  
153 Ernst & Young, 2011: 15 
154 19 July 2017 
155 Refer to 5.4.2 
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“[a]s a result of these differences, the adoption of the IFRS 9 accounting standard will result 
in significantly higher levels of impairments being recognised…”   
Section 11(jA) will be applicable to only “covered persons” as defined in section 24JB of the 
Act. While the effect of the change to IFRS 9 will have the greater impact on these financial 
institutions, all taxpayers will likely be forced to increase their impairments due to the 
removal of an incurred loss as a requirement.   
6.4.2 The SARS’ Response 
As has been stated above the draft amendment to section 11(j) includes the concept of a 
government notice containing guidelines on how the allowance is to be applied. It is 
submitted that the adoption of IFRS 9 will be of particular concern to the SARS and that the 
content of this notice will be much influenced by that accounting standard. What then can 
we expect the SARS’ response to be? Below I consider four possible responses. 
 IFRS 9 impairments are accepted as tax deductible   
From the Directive we can see that the SARS is not averse to using accounting standards as a 
starting point for the determination of an allowance. There is some precedent for this in 
foreign jurisdictions. The Indian tax authorities accept that where a debt has been determined 
to be bad or doubtful in terms of an accounting standard that debt may be claimed as a tax 
allowance.156 While this would certainly alleviate the practical burden on the Commissioner 
it is submitted that it is unlikely that this approach will be adopted. The presence of case law 
stating that the mere adoption of an accounting standard would not constitute an exercise of 
the Commissioner’s discretion means that such an approach would likely not be accepted by 
the courts. Additionally, IFRS 9’s forward looking approach to doubtful debts contrasts with 
the SARS interpretation that there should be a loss event before an allowance is claimed.157 
It is also unclear whether historical rates of recovery within the taxpayer’s business would be 
                                                     
156 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 2016 
157 Refer to 5.4.3.2. 
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sufficient to claim a doubtful debt allowance in the absence of a loss event such as a debtor 
defaulting on a payment.     
 IFRS 9 is accepted as a starting point and the 25% allowance rate is maintained 
The simple adoption of an accounting standard is an inappropriate method of applying the 
Commissioner’s discretion. We have seen that SARS is willing to use an accounting standard 
as a starting point in its determination of a doubtful debt allowance. I submit that this 
approach remains unacceptable: applying a fixed percentage of an accounting standard is just 
as absent of an exercise of the Commissioner’s mind. However, it is submitted that where the 
taxpayer is allowed an opportunity to submit information substantiating a different allowance 
rate the Commissioner will have applied their mind and the practice will be appropriate. It is 
possible that the same approach of the Commissioner using their discretion to apply a 25% 
rate could be maintained. It is submitted that this is highly unlikely.  
 IFRS 9 is accepted as a starting point and the 25% allowance rate is decreased 
It is submitted that where the IFRS 9 accounting standard is accepted as the starting point it 
is more likely that an allowance rate lower than 25% will be used by SARS. Evidence of this 
approach can be found in the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 17 of 2017. That act included 
section 11(jA), discussed in chapter 5.4.2, which set out percentages which would be granted 
as impairment allowances for each of the categories of debt for ‘covered persons’ which were 
lower than the percentages which had been granted by the Commissioner in the Directive. 
 IFRS 9 is not referred to when determining the tax allowance  
The Commissioner could abandon the accounting standard as a basis for determining the 
doubtful debt tax allowance entirely and require the taxpayer to compile a list of debtors for 
whom a loss event has been observed for which an allowance, most likely of 25%, could be 
allowed. This list of debtors is essentially the basis for the calculation of the pre-IFRS 9 
doubtful debt allowance. The taxpayer will not be required to develop new debtor 
identification systems, but rather to maintain two separate systems: the current system and 
an IFRS 9 compliant system.   This approach would have the benefit of keeping the allowance 
granted consistent with that granted in prior years and, for the Commissioner, of placing the 
burden of gathering information on the taxpayer.   
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 Removal of the Commissioner’s discretion  
On the 16th of July 2018, the 2018 Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill was released. The Bill 
proposed the substitution of the existing section 11(j) with the following paragraph: 
“(j)(i) an allowance equal to 25 per cent of the loss allowance relating to impairment, 
as contemplated in IFRS 9, in respect of debt other than in respect of lease receivables 
as defined in IFRS 9, if IFRS 9 is applied to that debt by that person for financial 
reporting purposes; or 
(ii) an allowance equal to 25 per cent of so much of any debt, other than a debt 
contemplated in subparagraph (i), due to the taxpayer, that would have been allowed 
as a deduction under any other provision of this Part had that debt become bad if that 
debt is 90 days or more in arrears:  
Provided that an allowance under this paragraph must be included in the income of 
the taxpayer in the following year of assessment.” 158  
The Amendment Bill proposes the removal of the Commissioner’s discretion from the 
determination of a doubtful debt replacing it with an allowance of 25% for IFRS 9 provisions 
for doubtful debts, or where IFRS 9 is not used, a 25% allowance for all debts 90 days or more 
in arrears. The Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2018 (Draft) 
released on 16 July 2018 notes that the 2015 amendment of section 11(j) which made 
provision for the replacement of the Commissioner’s discretion with criteria set out in a public 
notice issued by the Commissioner has been unable to come into effect as the criteria for 
claiming the allowance for doubtful debts have not yet been formulated. The application of a 
simple 25% allowance places into legislation the current practice of the Commissioner. The 
proposed amendment will come into operation on 1 January 2019 and apply in respect of 
years of assessment commencing on or after that date.  
  
                                                     




The change from IAS 39 to IFRS 9 was caused largely by the failure of the former to adequately 
identify impaired financial instruments before the 2008 financial crisis. The new standard is 
stricter on recognising the possibility of impairments. Many non-financial institutions will use 
a simplified form of the standard which eliminates to the need to begin with a 12 month 
impairment assessment and then at year end to evaluate whether a significant deterioration 
in credit worthiness has taken place before applying a lifetime expected cashflow impairment. 
All taxpayers will need to apply the new expected credit approach which requires that 
taxpayers consider reasonable and supportable forward-looking information that is available 
as well as past events and current conditions when determining impairment. This would 
therefore include the possibility of future credit loss events when determining impairments. 
This new method would result in a greater degree of estimation being exercised by taxpayers. 
The result of this new standard will likely be an increase in the size and timing of impairments 
as the accounting standard moves further away from the tenets espoused by the 
Commissioner as being vital to the recognition of a doubtful debt, primarily that a loss event 
must have actually occurred before an impairment may be recognized. It is expected 
therefore that the Commissioner will adjust the manner in which a doubtful debt allowance 
is granted, either through decreasing the 25% allowance or by requiring taxpayers to identify 








This dissertation sought, through the consideration of legislation and case law, 
pronouncements made by the Commissioner in explanatory memoranda and sector 
directives, and academic writings, to answer the following four questions:  
1. When will a debt be considered bad? 
2. When will a debt be considered doubtful? 
3. How is the allowance granted in terms of section 11(j) determined and how may the 
taxpayer challenge this determination? 
4. How will the change from IAS 39 to IFRS 9 affect the process by which the 
Commissioner determines the allowance to be granted in terms of a doubtful debt? 
7.1.1 When will a debt be considered bad? 
Definition 
There is no definition of a bad debt in the Income Tax Act. Case law informs us that whether 
a debt is bad is a factual question. All relevant circumstances must be considered with no 
factor a prerequisite for deduction. All relevant circumstances applicable to the specific debt 
under consideration must be considered. There is support in case law for the proposition that 
“outside considerations” are not applicable to the determination of whether a debt is bad, 
however it is submitted that where a debt is within a particular industry it is appropriate and 
necessary to include the extent to which debts are recoverable in a particular industry as a 
factor in determining whether a particular debt is bad.  
Timing 
The correct time to make a judgement on whether a debt is bad or not is at submission of the 
tax return. It is submitted that only information illuminating the situation of the debt as at 
the end of the year of assessment may be considered as the taxpayer must evaluate whether 
the debts has become bad during the year of assessment for which the tax return is 
submitted.  Once the taxpayer has determined that a debt has become bad that debt may 
only be claimed in that year of assessment. 
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7.1.2 When will a debt be considered doubtful? 
There is no definition of doubtful in the Income Tax Act. The ordinary definition of doubtful 
will apply. The Commissioner will determine whether they are satisfied that the debt is 
doubtful and the extent of the allowance to be granted to the taxpayer. A debt will only be 
doubtful where an event has occurred, casting doubt on the recoverability of the financial 
asset. It is not appropriate to use projections of future events as evidence that a debt is 
doubtful.  The Commissioner may not rely on an external standard, such as accounting 
standards, to determine whether a debt is doubtful or not. 
There is no clear dividing line between bad and doubtful debts. Where once they were used 
interchangeably, they are now separate concepts. There is not a point at which a debt stops 
being doubtful and starts being bad. A debt which is bad may also be doubtful where it meets 
the requirements of both sections.  
7.1.3 How is the allowance granted in terms of section 11(j) determined and how may the 
taxpayer challenge this determination? 
The Commissioner has a broad discretion to decide on the allowance granted. However, this 
discretion must be exercised in a manner which is procedurally fair, lawful and reasonable. In 
calculating the amount, the Commissioner will reduce the allowance granted proportional to 
the extent of the uncertainty inherent in the calculation. In order to fulfil the requirement of 
reasonableness, the allowance so granted should maintain a degree of proportionality with 
the doubtful debts determined. It is submitted that where sufficient historical data exists, the 
allowance granted should be equivalent to the historical rates. Where the link between the 
amount of the debt which is doubtful and the allowance granted is unreasonable in the 
opinion of the court, that court may remit the calculation to the Commissioner or alter the 
allowance granted itself. The Commissioner may not rely on practical expedients or generally 
expected practice to determine the allowance granted. The Commissioner may not rely on an 
external standard, such as accounting standards, to determine the extent of a doubtful debt 
allowance.  
It is submitted that if the purpose of the provision for doubtful debts is to provide relief to 
the taxpayer in proportion to the amount of debts which have not been recovered the 
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doubtful debt granted to the taxpayer should in general be equivalent to historical rates of 
recovery, where historical rates of recovery are relatively constant. 
Where historical recovery rates are unavailable or unreliable, all possible information, both 
historical and forward looking, should be utilised to obtain the most accurate prediction of 
the extent to which debts will not be recovered. Currently, forward looking information is not 
permitted when determining doubtful debts. However, it is submitted that the amendment 
in section 18(1)(j) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act159 empowers the Commissioner to 
adopt new criteria for the evaluation of doubtful debt which may contradict case law as the 
wording and meaning of the section has changed. The new criteria must, however, constitute 
just administrative action. 
For practical purposes it may be necessary for the Commissioner to establish a baseline 
allowance to be granted to the taxpayer in the absence of evidence provided by the taxpayer 
to substantiate different rates. It is submitted that historical recovery rates will in most 
circumstances provide evidence of the accuracy of a taxpayer’s doubtful debt estimate 
without the burden of being required to collect additional data. Aligning with historical 
recovery rates is the simplest approach to ensuring that the allowance granted by the 
Commissioner is a reasonable administrative action as required by PAJA and the Constitution. 
7.1.4 How will the change from IAS 39 to IFRS 9 affect the process by which the 
Commissioner determines the allowance to be granted in terms of section 11(j)? 
Although the new accounting standard cannot affect the meaning of the Income Tax Act, the 
practical approach to the evaluation of doubtful debts adopted by the Commissioner is closely 
linked to IAS 39 and the principle that only incurred losses constitute indications of doubtful 
debts. A change in the accounting standard will mean that the Commissioner will either have 
to accept IFRS 9 as the new base, lower the baseline allowance of 25% of doubtful debts to 
account for an expected increase in doubtful debts per the new standard or require the 
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taxpayer to keep a separate list of debts which would have been considered doubtful under 
the old IAS 39 standard. 
New legislation has been passed which may negate the need for these approaches. The 
doubtful debt allowances of financial institutions, the taxpayers who will be most affected by 
the adoption of IFRS 9, will in future be governed by section 11(jA), a section which does not 
grant the Commissioner a discretion. Section 11(j) has been amended by section 18(1)(j) of 
the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 25 of 2015 and will require a doubtful debt to be 
evaluated against criteria set out in a public notice. At the time of the writing of this 
dissertation the public notice has not yet been issued.  
7.2 Areas for further study 
While this dissertation has attempted to provide a comprehensive presentation of South 
African law surrounding bad and doubtful debts as at the end of 2017, there remain many 
areas of uncertainty to which further study may be applied.  The following are suggested 
topics for further research: 
 The interaction between income tax and value-added tax when a debt is determined 
to be bad; 
 A comparison between South African law around bad and doubtful debts and the law 
of a foreign jurisdiction such as India, Canada or the United Kingdom; 
 The tax consequences of the acquisition of a debtors book. 
Of great interest will be the manner in which the proposed amendments brought about by 
the adoption of IFRS 9 will function in practice. In the coming years the following questions 
will provide grounds for further studies:  
 Has the adoption of IFRS 9 resulted in greater bad and doubtful debt allowances being 
claimed? 




 How do the criteria set out in the public notice referred to in section 18(1)(j) of the 
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